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Summary
As the trend toward a ubiquitous computing world is gaining momentum, concern about
security in wireless networks has become the major obstacle of their extensive applica-
tions. Due to their unique characteristics, wireless networks are more vulnerable against
di®erent attacks than their wired counterpart.
Di®erent security protocols have been proposed and investigated to counter against
security attacks in wireless networks. Essentially, these protocols can be classi¯ed into
two groups: two-party key exchange protocols, and multi-party key management pro-
tocols (a.k.a. group key management protocols). In this thesis, we investigated both
two-party and multi-party security protocols for wireless networks.
We ¯rst studied two-party authentication and key exchange protocols for access
control in wireless networks in public places. Our analysis shows that previous access
control protocols have serious security °aws which make them vulnerable to attacks.
Then we proposed a password-based protocol and a PKC-based protocol under the two-
layer access control architecture, respectively. Both of our protocols avoid weaknesses of
previous proposals and provide mutual authentication, perfect forward secrecy, access
control on wireless networks. Moreover, they also provide DoS resistance and identity
anonymity for clients. We presented detailed security and performance analysis for
our protocols, which showed that both our protocols are secure and e±cient for access
control in wireless networks.
xii
We then studied multi-party key management protocols for wireless networks. We
proposed a highly e±cient group key agreement scheme based on a novel key tree con-
struction approach for wireless ad hoc networks. The key tree is constructed taking into
consideration of the multicast tree which represents the underlying network topology.
Our scheme greatly reduces communication and computation cost for group key agree-
ment and has high °exibility in handling dynamic group memberships. We implemented
our scheme on ns-2 and evaluated its performance in terms of total delay, communica-
tion cost and message loss. Our simulation results show that the scheme enjoys great
advantages over existing schemes proposed in the literature.
An e±cient password-only group key agreement protocol is also proposed for wireless
networks. In this scheme, each user shares a human-memorable password with a trusted
server, and a group of users from a multi-hop wireless network intend to agree on a group
key with the server's assistance. Our password-based group key agreement protocol
achieves communication and computation e±ciency, as a group key tree well-suited for
multi-hop wireless networks is specially designed for group key agreement. With our
protocol, a group of users can agree on a group key within only 3 °ows, and each user
needs only 5 +O(log n) exponentiations.
In this thesis, the two proposed access control schemes not only avoid weaknesses
present in existing protocols, but also satisfy new security requirements of wireless net-
works. While the proposed group key agreement scheme for ad hoc networks achieves
great e±ciency in computation and communications with a novel key tree construction
method. Also using the group key tree structure, our group password-authenticated key
exchange protocol provides convenience, scalability and great computation e±ciency.
xiii
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The emergence and fast development of wireless network technologies result in exten-
sive and wide applications in our daily lives. Wireless communications provide great
bene¯ts such as °exibility, mobility, portability and low deploy cost for organizations
and users. Mobile devices like PDAs, laptops and mobile phones are widely used for
various purposes: accessing emails, sharing ¯les, real-time communications etc. While
value-added service providers are relying on wireless technologies to provide services to
their clients in a more convenient way.
Wireless technologies provide di®erent capabilities that satisfy di®erent users and
requirements. Wireless local area networks (WLAN), such as IEEE 802.11, provide
short-range, high-speed wireless data connections between mobile devices and nearby ac-
cess points. Wireless personal area networks (WPAN) like Bluetooth provide a method
for interconnecting devices centered around an individual person's workspace. Pro-
viding a wireless coverage larger than WLAN, wireless metropolitan area networks
(WMAN) enable users to establish wireless connections between multiple locations
within a metropolitan area like a city or university campus. Wireless wide area net-
works (WWAN), such as 2G and 3G systems, provide wireless connections over a large
geographic area through the use of multiple antenna sites or satellite systems maintained
by wireless service providers. However, a wireless ad hoc networks is a self-organized
1
infrastructureless network formed by a group of mobile nodes. Such a network provides
great convenience and °exibility for users since no infrastructure is required within the
network.
Though wireless technologies provide great bene¯ts for users, they also raise concerns
on security problems of wireless networks. First of all, openness of radio media leads to
more serious security problems in wireless networks besides the same security threats
faced by wired networks. In wireless networks, information is transmitted over the open
air and anyone can intercept it with suitable devices. As a result, an attacker can easily
eavesdrop or launch active attacks against wireless communications. Since there is no
physical boundary existing in wireless networks like in wired networks, attackers can
easily gain unauthorized access to wireless networks with suitable equipments. What
make things worse are resource constraints of wireless networks, which make providing
security solutions for wireless networks a very challenging work. Wireless networks
usually have a lower bandwidth than wired networks, and mobile devices often have
limited computation capability and energy. As a result, it is easy for attackers to
mount successful DoS attacks to deplete computation resource and energy of mobile
devices. Hence it is important to design e±cient security schemes immune to DoS
attacks for wireless networks. Mobility of wireless devices also brings privacy problems
for roaming users. For a roaming user, his/her movement pattern and location are very
important privacy information and should be protected from disclosure. While situations
for wireless ad hoc networks are even more complex as infrastructures are not available
in such networks. In wireless ad hoc networks, each node can only communicate directly
with other nodes within its power range, and some nodes are required to relay packets
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on behalf of a source node in order to deliver data to its destination. As a result, security
issues in ad hoc networks are more challenging.
1.1 Security Issues in Wireless Networks
Security issues in wireless networks can be considered from three aspects: security re-
quirements, security attacks and security mechanisms. Various security mechanisms are
designed to ful¯ll security requirements so as to counter against di®erent security at-
tacks. Due to characteristics and constraints of wireless networks, wireless networks are
facing more security threats than wired counterparts. In this section, we discuss these
three aspects of security issues for wireless networks in detail, respectively.
1.1.1 Security Requirements
In traditional networks, authentication, con¯dentiality and integrity are the three funda-
mental security requirements studied for tens of years in research. These requirements
are also basic research objectives in wireless environments. Authentication means that
a communication partner can be unambiguously identi¯ed during the communication.
Sometimes only unilateral authentication is enough for secure communication, while
mutual authentication is desired to avoid attacks in most cases. Various authentica-
tion protocols are employed to provide mutual authentication for communication net-
works. Con¯dentiality means that the exchanged information during the communication
is not disclosed to unauthorized parties. Encryption, implemented by stream ciphers
and block ciphers, is used to achieve con¯dentiality. Integrity ensures consistency of
data and detecting unauthorized creation, alteration, or destruction of data. This can
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be achieved by using message authentication code (MAC), or message integrity code
(MIC). Non-repudiation sometimes is also mentioned as a basic security requirement
in some applications like billing. This requirement prevents either the sender or the
receiver from denying a transmitted message, and digital signature is usually used to
provide non-repudiation as well as integrity.
In wireless environments, we also consider the following security requirements. Avail-
ability ensures legitimate parties are not unduly denied access to resources and services
of host networks. This requirement is very important as a network is meaningless if it
cannot provide services. To assure availability, security solutions should o®er resistance
to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, including memory-DoS, computation-DoS and net-
work bandwidth-DoS attacks. Access control requires that only authorized parties can
access the wireless network. Fine grained access control, ideally on a per-packet level,
should be enforced for wireless networks. Perfect forward secrecy is crucial in that it
protects previous session keys and con¯dential messages against compromising of long
term secrets, like private keys, passwords. A new requirement introduced by the unique
features wireless networks is anonymity, which requires the identity of the mobile user
should be protected from the network it gains access to. This requirement implies user
location privacy and unlinkability between two communications, and protects the user's
motion pattern from being disclosed.
At the end, an important requirement on security schemes for wireless networks is
e±ciency. The security solution should be e±cient in both computation and communi-




Security research in traditional networks has identi¯es various attacks against communi-
cating parties, and such attacks can be also applied against wireless networks. Generally,
these attacks can be divided into two major types: passive attacks and active attacks.
Passive attacks do not involve any message alteration, and refer to eavesdropping or
tra±c analysis. In contrast to passive attacks, active attacks involve some modi¯cation
or creation of messages during communication. Passive attacks are hard to detect, but
they are not as dangerous as active attacks because they do not a®ect execution of
security protocols. Compared to passive attacks, active attacks are much more danger-
ous and di±cult to defend since their active intervention causes much more problems
for security protocols. Fortunately, they can be detected by legitimate communication
parties.
Common passive attacks mainly include eavesdropping and tra±c analysis. Active
attacks, however, can be classi¯ed into the following categories. Masquerade attacks re-
fer to an illegitimate entity pretending to be an authorized entity. While replay attacks
refer to retransmission of previously captured messages which may result in unautho-
rized e®ect. Message alteration attacks are to modify messages from an authorized party
to produce unauthorized e®ect. While Denial of Service (DoS) attacks aim to degrade
performance of networks and prevent normal access to network services and resources.
What has been discussed is a general classi¯cation of attacks in communication net-
works, and some attacks may employ much more complex analysis and techniques. For
instance, the well-known man-in-the-middle attack is a complex form of masquerade
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attack; several parties can also collude to compromise secrets of other parties, which is
referred to as the collude attack.
Threat of these attacks has been intensi¯ed due to the nature of wireless medium.
Attacks against wireless networks can be launched without physical connection to the
target networks. For example, attackers can easily eavesdrop or analyze tra±c in wire-
less networks within radio transmission range using a suitable transceiver. Also access
to wireless networks is open to attackers as no physical boundary exists. And denial
of service attacks are more e®ective in wireless networks since wireless networks are
resource-constrained. Moreover, privacy information like identity and location in wire-
less networks can be the target of attacks.
1.1.3 Security Mechanisms
Various security mechanisms have been designed to counter against security attacks and
satisfy security requirements in wireless networks. Security primitives, like encryption,
decryption, signature and one-way hash function, are designed to provide basic crypto-
graphic functions. And based on these security primitives, security protocols have been
designed to provide di®erent level of security for communication networks. Among these
security protocols , authentication and key exchange protocols are the most basic ones
that provide basic security services for communicating parties.
Generally, authentication and key exchange protocols can be divided into two groups:
two-party and multi-party protocols, the latter of which are also known as group key
management protocols. Two-party authentication and key exchange protocols have been
well studied in the context of traditional networks, and research results from traditional
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networks have been employed in wireless environments. However, existing two-party
authentication and key exchange protocols are not satisfactory in security, and they
usually fall short of one or more security requirements for wireless networks. Some
protocols do not o®er client anonymity [6, 18{20], some do not provide perfect forward
secrecy [3,4,9,12], while some are unable to o®er DoS resistance [3,4,17,19,25]. Moreover,
some protocols are even insecure against well-known attacks. It is still a challenging
work to design a sound authentication and key exchange protocols that ful¯ll all the
requirements for wireless networks.
With proliferation of group-oriented applications, such as teleconferencing, pay-TV,
distributed interactive games, secure group key management protocols for wireless net-
works are urgently needed to protect group communications. Existing group key man-
agement protocols cannot be directly used in wireless networks since they are originally
designed for wired networks and di®erences of wireless networks make them inapplicable
in wireless environments. Previous schemes [75,76,79] are usually too costly in compu-
tation or communications for wireless networks, and hence some e®orts have been spent
on improving their e±ciency to suit requirements of wireless environments. Most group
key management schemes exploit a key hierarchy in group key establishment to improve
e±ciency because of advantages of the hierarchical tree structure. But the hierarchi-
cal key tree is usually constructed independent of network topology, which results in
ine±ciency in communications. Some studies have been conducted to exploit network
topology in group key distribution schemes for wireless ad hoc networks [88, 89] and
wireless LANs [90]. But similar study has not conducted on group key agreement for
wireless ad hoc networks yet.
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Group key agreement protocols using only human-memorable passwords are conve-
nient for use and we call them group password-authenticated key exchange protocols.
Using human-memorable passwords for authentication and key exchange is most conve-
nient and has been extensively applied in the real world. Although two-party password-
authenticated key exchange protocols [98, 99] have been well investigated, password-
based group key agreement protocols have not received enough attention and only a few
proposals appeared recently [93]. Among these password-based group key agreement
protocols, they are either unscalable to large group size or ine±cient in computation
and communications.
1.2 Thesis Contribution
In this thesis, we studied both two-party and multi-party protocols for authentication
and key exchange in wireless environments, and presented several security solutions to
achieve authentication and key establishment in wireless networks.
Access control protocols for wireless networks fall into the category of two-party au-
thentication and key exchange protocols, and they are designed to prevent unauthorized
access in wireless networks. Access control protocols are important in wireless networks
because wireless networks have no physical boundary and can be accessed over the air.
Previous access control protocols for wireless networks fail to ful¯ll some of the security
requirements, like anonymity, DoS resistance. In this thesis, we proposed two access
control protocols for wireless networks to ful¯ll all necessary security requirements. The
¯rst protocol is based on weak passwords while the second one relies on PKC for au-
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thentication and access control. Both protocols are designed to o®er user anonymity as
well as resistance to DoS attacks for wireless networks.
To avoid ine±ciency resulted by constructing the group key tree independent of
network topology, we designed a group key agreement scheme in which a key tree is
constructed to match the network topology. Such a key tree structure can localize
transmission of keying information and hence signi¯cantly reduces communication cost
of rekeying. We implemented our group key construction scheme on ns-2 and evaluated
its performance. Simulation results showed overhead of our scheme is reduced to about
1=4 of other schemes.
This thesis also proposed an e±cient and scalable password-based group key agree-
ment protocol for multi-hop wireless networks. In this protocol, each user shares a
di®erent human-memorable password with a trusted server, and a group of users from a
multi-hop wireless network intend to agree on a group key with the server's assistance.
The password-based group key agreement protocol has great e±ciency in communica-
tions and computation, as a group key tree well-suited for multi-hop networks is specially
designed for that purpose. The protocol is also scalable to group size. With this proto-
col, a group of users can agree on a group key within only 3 °ows, and each user needs
only 5 +O(log n) exponentiations.
1.3 Thesis Organization
In Chapter 2, we present related work in the area of security in wireless networks. We
review access control protocols for wireless LAN ¯rst, then we look at the group key
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agreement protocols for wireless networks. Finally, we investigate password-based group
key agreement protocols.
In Chapter 3, we discuss our two access control protocols for wireless LAN. First
we present our password-based protocol for access control in wireless networks. This
protocol is designed to avoid security °aws of the so-called Lancaster protocol. Then
we discuss the other access control protocol which is based on public key cryptography.
We show that both protocols avoid security °aws of previously proposed protocols, and
they o®er advanced features like client anonymity and DoS resistance.
In Chapter 4, we investigate group key agreement protocols for ad hoc networks.
A new group key tree construction approach for ad hoc networks is described and an-
alyzed in detail. We show that how the group key tree in our scheme is constructed
from the underlying network topology, and how the constructed key tree can local-
ize rekeying message transmission so as to improve communication e±ciency. Finally,
we also demonstrate the performance of our scheme by compared with other key tree
construction methods.
In Chapter 5, we present our password-based group key agreement protocol, which
can be used in multi-hop wireless networks as well as wired networks. We discuss
drawbacks of previous password-based group key agreement protocols ¯rst, and then
propose our protocol. We analyze security of our protocol and show that it is e±cient
in computation and communications.
In Chapter 6, we conclude the thesis by summarizing the work that have been done.
And I also discuss possible future research directions.
10
CHAPTER 2
Review of Related Work
In this Chapter, we review the literature on security research for wireless networks,
including wireless LAN and ad hoc networks. First of all, we give an overview of di®erent
types of wireless networks. After that, we review authentication and key exchange
protocols for wireless LAN, then we turn to group key agreement protocols for wireless
ad hoc networks. Finally, we study password-based key exchange protocols and analyze
existing password-based group key agreement protocols.
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN)
Wireless LAN is a kind of local area network that transmits data over the air via high-
frequency radio links. In WLAN, wireless base stations (access points) are wired to an
Ethernet network and able to transmit messages over an area of several hundred feet
through walls and other non-metal barriers. Roaming users can be handed o® from one
access point to another like a cellular phone system. The main WLAN standards are the
IEEE 802.11 standard [33] and HIPERLAN. Other standards like HomeRF, OpenAir
are not so in°uential as 802.11 and HIPERLAN.
IEEE 802.11 is currently the major open standard developed by the working group
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11 of the IEEE LAN/MAN Standards Committee (IEEE 802). It consists of a set
of di®erent wireless standards: 802.11, 802.11b, 802.11g, 802.11a. IEEE 802.11 is the
original standard specifying wireless data transmission, but widespread use of 802.11
networks begins only after 802.11b was rati¯ed. IEEE 802.11b (a.k.a WiFi) is currently
the most popular standard. It works at the 2.4GHz band and can transfer data at a
speed up to 11 Mbit/s within a range of 30-100 meters. Di®erent from 802.11b working
at the 2.4GHz band, IEEE 802.11a operates on the licence-free 5 GHz frequency band.
IEEE 802.11a is four times faster than 802.11b, providing a speed up to 54 Mbit/s and
a range of 10-100 meters. IEEE 802.11g is the latest standard and is just as fast as
802.11a, but operates on the 2.4 GHz frequency band.
HIPERLAN/1, HIgh PErformance Radio LAN version 1 is an ETSI standard whose
goal was to achieve an even higher data rate than 802.11. The standard covers the
physical and the MAC part of the Data Link layers like 802.11. Working at the fre-
quency of 5GHz, HIPERLAN/1 has a coverage range of 50 meters, and supports slow
mobility of 1.4m/s. HIPERLAN/1 provides transmission throughput of 32 kbit/s for
sound, 2 Mbit/s for video, and 10Mbit/s for data. HIPERLAN/2 is designed as a fast
wireless connection for many kinds of networks: UMTS back bone network, ATM and
IP networks. Also it works as a network at home like HIPERLAN/1. HIPERLAN/2
uses the 5 GHz band and provides a transmission speed up to 54 Mbit/s.
The IEEE 802.11 Wireless LAN Architecture
The 802.11 architecture comprises several components and services that interact to
provide station mobility transparent to the higher layers of the network stack.
The wireless LAN station (STA) is the most basic component of the wireless network.
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A station is any device that contains the functionality of the 802.11 protocol, and a
connection to the wireless media. Typically the 802.11 functions are implemented in the
hardware and software of a network interface card (NIC).
A station could be a laptop, a handheld device, or an access point. Stations may
be mobile, portable, or stationary and all stations support the 802.11 station services of
authentication, de-authentication, privacy, and data delivery. Wireless access points are
commonly built into broadband routers, providing both wired and wireless connectivity
for a small network.
A typical architecture of wireless LAN is illustrated in Fig. 2.1. The access points are
connected by the backbone network to provide wireless access and services for mobile
stations. The access point backbone network is connected to the internal network with
an access router which performs access control. Within the internal network, RADIUS
server, PKI server and other servers provide services like authentication, accounting etc.
Before mobile stations can obtain access to the internal network, they usually need to
be authenticated and allowed to access by the access router. After mobile stations have
access to the internal network, they can access to Internet via the ¯rewall.
2.1.2 Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN)
WPAN is a wireless network typically limited to a small cell radius. In an o±ce environ-
ment, a WPAN would be used to transfer data between a handheld device and a desktop
machine or a printer. For example, a mobile user could download e-mails or Web data
into a dual-mode smart phone or PDA and then exchange that data with a machine


















Figure 2.1: A Typical 802.11 Wireless Network Architecture
alarms, appliances and entertainment systems.
Bluetooth is a WPAN technology developed by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group
(www.bluetooth.com) founded in 1998 by Ericsson, IBM, Intel, Nokia and Toshiba.
Bluetooth provides up to 720 Kbps data transfer within a range of 10 meters and up
to 100 meters with a power boost. Bluetooth uses omnidirectional radio waves that
can transmit through walls and other non-metal barriers. Bluetooth transmits in the
unlicensed 2.4GHz band and uses a frequency hopping spread spectrum technique that
changes its signal 1600 times per second.
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IEEE 802.15 is a set of standards de¯ned for WPAN. IEEE 802.15.1 de¯nes the lower
layers of the Bluetooth speci¯cation, and it is approved by the IEEE in 2002. IEEE
802.15.1 is fully compatible with Bluetooth 1.1. IEEE 802.15.3 and 802.15.3a de¯ne the
high data rate WPAN systems, while 802.15.4 standardizes WPAN for low data rate
systems. HIPERPAN is another WPAN standard developed by ETSI in Europe.
Bluetooth WPAN Architecture
Bluetooth communication occurs between a master radio and a slave radio. Blue-
tooth radios are symmetric in that the same device may operate as a master and also
the slave. Two or more radio devices together form ad-hoc networks called piconets. All
units within a piconet share the same channel. Each piconet has one master device and
one or more slaves. There may be up to seven active slaves at a time within a piconet.
A master is the only one that may initiate a Bluetooth communication link. However,
once a link is established, the slave may request a master/slave switch to become the
master. Slaves are not allowed to talk to each other directly. All communication occurs
within the slave and the master. Slaves within a piconet must also synchronize their
internal clocks and frequency hops with that of the master. Each piconet uses a di®erent
frequency hopping sequence. Radio devices used Time Division Multiplexing (TDM). A
master device in a piconet transmits on even numbered slots and the slaves may transmit
on odd numbered slots.
Multiple piconets with overlapping coverage areas form a scatternet. Each piconet
may have only one master, but slaves may participate in di®erent piconets on a time-
division multiplex basis. A device may be a master in one piconet and a slave in another














Figure 2.2: Network Topology of Bluetooth WPAN
2.1.3 Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWAN)
Current WWAN technologies include telephony networks like GSM (Global Systems
for Mobile Communications), GPRS (General Packet Radio Service), UMTS (Universal
Mobile Telecommunications Service) etc. GSM is the widely used 2nd generation cellular
network system. This digital cellular system focuses on voice as well as data. But its
data rate is too low to be suitable for large amount of data transfer. Developed on
the basis of GSM, GPRS introduced packet technology for the ¯rst time to support
higher data rates, and left voice network unchanged. Even though, it doesn't satisfy the
increasing requirement for higher data rate. The 3rd generation (3G) wireless network
emerged to o®er Internet and Intranet services as well as traditional voice communication
service with better performance. UMTS and CDMA2000 are the most important 3G
standards speci¯ed by 3GPP and 3GPP2, respectively. UMTS uses W-CDMA as the
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underlying standard, and represents the European/Japanese answer to the ITU IMT-
2000 requirements for 3G Cellular radio systems. UMTS supports up to 1920 kbit/s
data transfer rates. CDMA2000 is a 3G mobile telecommunications standard that uses
CDMA, and it supports data rate up to 3.1Mb/s. Besides telephony networks, Mobile
IPv6 also falls into the WWAN category. Now IETF has standardized Mobile IPv6 with
the Internet standard RFC 3775 specifying how the IPv6 Internet operates with mobile
computers.
2.1.4 Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks (WMAN)
WMAN is the most important and promising area in wireless networks now. Compared
to WLAN, WMAN has a larger coverage area up to a city, and it has a higher data
rate up to 70Mb/s. Currently there are several co-existing WMAN standards, including
IEEE 802.16, HIPERMAN, and WiBro. The IEEE 802.16 standard, also known as
WiMAX, is being supported and promoted by a group of leading vendors of wireless
access equipments and telecommunications components. The current 802.16 standard is
IEEE 802.16-2004, which only addresses ¯xed systems. Using the 2-11GHz frequencies
which can penetrate walls and other dense objects, 802.16-2004 provides transmission to
stationary devices and replaces prior 802.16 and 802.16a speci¯cations. While 802.16e
is an extension of 802.16-2004 for mobile use in the 2-6GHz band. It allows people
to communicate while walking or riding in cars. In Europe, ETSI developed a similar

































Figure 2.3: Bandwidths and Ranges of Di®erent Wireless Technologies
2.1.5 Mobile Ad hoc Networks
A mobile ad hoc network is an infrastructureless, self-organized wireless network formed
by a collection of mobile nodes that can communicate each other via wireless radio. In
ad hoc networks, there is no any available infrastructure like routers and servers, and
every mobile node needs to serve as a router to forward packets for others besides being
a normal node. Every node in ad hoc networks is capable of arbitrary movement, and
the network topology is frequently changing.
A number of routing protocols have been proposed for ad hoc networks to facili-
tate communications within the network. They can be categorized into two groups:
table-driven and on-demand routing protocols. Table-driven routing protocols maintain
consistent, up-to-date routing information from each node to every other node in the
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network. Each node maintains one or more tables to store routing information and
propagates topology changes throughout the network. On-demand routing protocols
creates route only when the source node has packets to send to the destination. The
source node can ¯nd the route to the destination node by a route discovery process.
Destination-Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) is a table-driven routing protocol, while
Ad hoc On-Demand Vector (AODV) [63] and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) are on-
demand routing protocols.
Figure 2.4: A Typical Ad hoc Network
2.2 Authentication and Key Exchange Protocols for Wire-
less LANs
Due to prevalence of wireless networks, there has been a lot of research focusing on
access control and authentication protocols for wireless networks. These protocols are
usually designed to authentication and key exchange between a mobile station and a
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wireless LAN. Among these protocols, some are based on symmetric cryptosystem, some
are based on public key cryptosystems, while some are hybrid cryptosystem based pro-
tocols. Unfortunately, existing solutions for wireless networks cannot ful¯ll all security
requirements, and some of them even have serious security °aws.
2.2.1 Protocols Based on Symmetric Cryptosystem
The Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol used in the IEEE standard 802.11 [33]
relies on symmetric cryptosystem for access control in wireless networks. WEP is in-
tended to protect wireless communications from eavesdropping as well as preventing
unauthorized access to wireless networks. It relies on a shared secret between the mo-
bile station and the access point to achieve the aforementioned goals. However, it has
been indicated that WEP has serious design °aws that make WEP vulnerable against
both passive and active attacks [7, 11]. Moreover, WEP slides over key management
problem and leaves it as an open problem for implementation.
To solve the above security problems, IEEE speci¯es the 802.11i standard [35] to
enhance the security of 802.11. In the 802.11i standard, a long term security archi-
tecture for 802.11 called the Robust Security Network (RSN) and the Robust Security
Network Association (RSNA) are de¯ned for wireless networks. RSNA uses the IEEE
802.1X standard [34], also known as port-based access control protocol, to perform ac-
cess control, authentication, key management, and key establishment mechanisms. In
IEEE 802.1X standard, EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol), which is a °exible
protocol used to carry arbitrary authentication information, is used to carry authenti-
cation and key establishment messages. EAP provides °exibility and extensibility for
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authentication by de¯ning an independent message exchange layer. Depending on the
result of authentication, IEEE 802.1X controls the °ow of MAC data units by chang-
ing the port status. Actually, IEEE 802.1X is a two-layer access control mechanism in
which authentication and access control are implemented at di®erent layers. However,
it has been pointed out that the 802.1X protocol is vulnerable to the session hijacking
attack and the man-in-the-middle attack [30] if authentication protocols over EAP do
not provide strong mutual authentication.
Developed by Cisco, LEAP (Lightweight Extensible Authentication Protocol) [20]
over EAP emerges to ¯ll the gap of key management and authentication left by WEP.
LEAP is based on symmetric cryptosystem, and it uses a password shared between
the client and the server to perform authentication and key exchange. Though LEAP
provides a means of mutual authentication and key management for wireless networks,
it provides zero resistance against o²ine dictionary attacks as LEAP can be broken
within minutes by dictionary attacks [21].
Basically, protocols relying solely on symmetric cryptosystem are unable to ful¯ll the
requirement of user anonymity as well as perfect forward secrecy. In such protocols, the
user needs to disclose his identity so that the server knows which shared secret should
be used for authentication and key exchange. And Di±e-Hellman key exchange is not
used for key establishment in such protocols, so forward secrecy is not o®ered.
2.2.2 Password-based Public Key Protocols
Password-based protocols, also known as password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
protocols, employ weak human-memorable passwords for authentication and key ex-
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change. This interesting problem on how to achieve authentication and key exchange
using only a human-memorable password is ¯rst introduced by Bellovin and Merritt
[98], and they also provided a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol
named the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol, and the augmented encrypted
key exchange protocol in [99], which is an improvement of the EKE protocol. Since
then, it has been a great deal of research e®ort spent on this subject. According to
the number of parties involved in the protocols, PAKE protocols can be divided into
two-party and multi-party (group) password-based protocols. In this section, we only
discuss two-party password-based protocols, and multi-party password-based protocols
are discussed in Section 2.5.3.
IEEE P1363 Standard Working Group has been engaged in standardization on
password-based public-key cryptographic protocols. Currently, the working group is
studying the PAKE protocols SPEKE [26], SRP [122], PAK [36,116] and AMP [29,109,
110]. Besides these protocols, there are a number of PAKE protocols proposed in the
literature. For the PAKE protocols, the most crucial point is their resistance to o®-line
dictionary attacks (or password guessing attacks). Unfortunately, there have been many
attacks against various PAKE protocols in the literature, which in turn shows that these
PAKE protocols fail to ful¯ll the basic requirement.
The PAKE protocol proposed by Zhu et al. [123] is specially designed for imbalanced
wireless networks. The advantage of this protocol is that one (the mobile node) of the
two parties is very lightly computation burdened, which is desirable for mobile nodes
in wireless networks. However, as pointed out by Bao [94], the security of this protocol
relies on the length of the second party's identity, but not the size of RSA modulo n.
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As a result, this PAKE protocol is insecure if the length of the identity is short, which
is highly possible in practice.
Several protocols over EAP based on PAKE protocols have also been proposed as
IETF drafts, i.e. EAP-PAX [14], EAP-SRP [16], and EAP-SPEKE. The main disad-
vantages of pure PAKE protocols are their incapability of client identity protection and
susceptibility against DoS attacks, and hence they are not suitable for access control
in wireless networks. In PAKE protocols, the client requires to disclose his identity to
the server so that the server knows which password should be used for authentication.
As a result, such protocols cannot provide identity con¯dentiality for clients. On the
other hand, in such protocols the server can only authenticate the client after expensive
computation. This causes the protocols susceptible to DoS attacks, since anyone can
send requests to launch the server into computational expensive operations. As a result,
EAP-SRP and EAP-SPEKE fail to provide user anonymity and resistance against DoS
attacks.
Unlike traditional PAKE protocols, the EAP-PAX protocol is a hybrid PAKE pro-
tocol where the server holds a certi¯cate, which enables it to provide client identity
con¯dentiality. However, it has several design °aws and cannot meet all requirements
of wireless networks. First of all, it is vulnerable to dictionary attacks during its reg-
istration phase if the server does not have a certi¯cate. Besides, the protocol replaces
the weak password on both the server and the client side with a generated random
secret on each update. As a result, the protocol doesn't obtain convenience of using
human-memorable passwords in later authentication. Furthermore, the protocol is sus-
ceptible to DoS attacks since any part can trick the server into expensive public key
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cryptographic decryption.
Due to the disadvantages of traditional PAKE protocols as discussed, it is desirable
to design a hybrid PAKE protocol where the server holds a public key certi¯cate like
EAP-PAX to o®er client identity con¯dentiality but avoid its weaknesses. Hence we
propose a new hybrid PAKE protocol that can o®er client identity con¯dentiality as
well as resistance to DoS attacks. Our protocol avoids the disadvantages of traditional
PAKE protocols but o®ers same convenience for users.
2.2.3 PKC-based Authentication Protocols
PKC-based protocols for wireless networks relies on public key cryptosystems for au-
thentication and key exchange. They emphasize on di®erent aspects of wireless network
security: some aim at providing user anonymity, some intend to reduce computation
complexity, while some focus on non-repudiation. Owing to the asymmetry of PKC
cryptosystems, it is easy for them to achieve client identity con¯dentiality during au-
thentication. But many protocols still fail to ful¯ll one or more security requirements for
wireless networks. However, we propose a PKC-based authentication protocols for ac-
cess control in wireless networks, which avoids known weaknesses of previous proposals
and o®ers client identity con¯dentiality and resistance to DoS attacks.
² The Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol
Designed to o®er user anonymity which is important for mobile environments, the
Beller-Chang-Yacobi protocol was ¯rst proposed by Beller, Chang, and Yacobi [9],
and later improved by Carlsen [13] and then by Mu and Varadharajan [32]. The
revised BCY protocol employ Modular Square Root public key cryptosystem.
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In the protocol, the user's identity and certi¯cate are encrypted with a secret
only the server can obtain. However, the BCY protocol does not provide mutual
authentication and implicit key con¯rmation, and anyone can impersonate as the
user or the server without being detected. Furthermore, the protocol does not
o®er perfect forward secrecy as the session key is not generated from two random
exponentials by Di±e-Hellman computation.
² The Aziz-Di±e Protocol
The Aziz-Di±e protocol proposed by Aziz and Di±e [4] is designed for privacy
protection and authentication in wireless local area networks. But this protocol
fails to satisfy several requirements. Since both the client and the server are
required to exchange certi¯cates during the protocol, the identities of the client
and the server are totally exposed to eavesdroppers. On the other hand, it commits
itself in heavy public key computation whenever the server receives a request,
which results in susceptibility to DoS attacks. Moreover, the session key is not
established with Di±e-Hellman exchange, and hence the protocol does not obtain
perfect forward secrecy and compromise of private keys would disclose session
keys.
² The Aydos-Sunar-K»oc Protocol
Aydos, Sunar and K»oc [6] proposed an authentication and key agreement proto-
col employing elliptic-curve techniques for wireless environments. However, this
protocol fails to ful¯ll a number of security requirements as mentioned earlier. In
the ASK protocol, the server is not authenticated to the user, and user identity
anonymity can be easily compromised by comparing users' public keys. The pro-
25
tocol has no freshness checking and this leads to known-key attacks by replaying
corresponding messages. Finally, the protocol has no forward secrecy as session
keys can be easily recovered when private keys of both parties are compromised.
² The Zhou-Lam Protocol
The Zhou-Lam protocol by Zhou and Lam [45] was designed for undeniable billing
in mobile communications. It is intended for a roaming user to register with a
new mobile network and set up a payment mechanism with the new network
when the user roams into this network. It is composed of two protocols: the
registration protocol and the service request protocol. The registration protocol
enables the user and the server to share a common session key with the help
of a trusted third party, and the TTP also selects a temporary identity for the
user to protect the user's real identity from disclosure. But the protocol does
not guarantee authentication of the user to the server though it is not important
during registration. The session key is generated only by the trusted third party,
which results in lack of forward secrecy.
² The Boyd-Park Protocol
The Boyd-Park protocol [12] is a public key protocol designed for wireless com-
munications. In order for computation e±ciency, it does not use Di±e-Hellman
key exchange to derive the session key. Instead, the session key is computed as
a hash of two random nonces chosen by the user and the server. Therefore, it
does not obtain perfect forward secrecy. The bene¯ts of BP protocol include user
anonymity and reduced computation complexity.
² The ASPeCT Protocol
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Developed by the European Commission ACTS project ASPeCT, the ASPeCT
protocol [3] is designed for secure communications in personal communication
networks. The protocol establishes the session key by Di±e-Hellman computation
from the server's private key and the random nonce of the user. In order for
user anonymity, the user's identity is encrypted with the established session key
in the protocol. Although it provides user identity con¯dentiality by encrypting
user identity, ASPeCT does not obtain perfect forward secrecy because the session
key is computed based on the server's private key and the user's random nonce.
The protocol also su®ers from DoS attacks as the server is required to commit
expensive Di±e-Hellman computation after receiving the ¯rst message.
² The IKE and JFK Protocol
The Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2) [25] and the Just Fast Keying (JFK)
protocol [1] are not originally designed for wireless networks but for wired net-
works. Due to computation limitation of current mobile devices, IKE and JFK
may not get extensive adoption currently. But as the rapid development on pro-
cessors' processing capability, these protocols can be also employed for wireless
networks in the near future.
The IKE protocol [25] speci¯ed in the IETF Internet draft o®ers identity con¯-
dentiality but no resistance to DoS attacks. The JFK protocol [1] speci¯ed in
another IETF Internet draft gives a solution for providing immunity to DoS at-
tacks and identity con¯dentiality at the same time. The JFK protocol can resist
DoS attacks on exhausting either computation resource or storage resource, and
it also can protect the identity of the client from both active and passive attacks.
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However, the disadvantage of both protocols is that each user needs a public key
certi¯cate for authentication and key exchange, which incurs inconvenience and
too heavy a burden for users and organizations.
² PKC-based Protocols over EAP
A set of IETF drafts have de¯ned di®erent security protocols over EAP based
on public key cryptosystems: EAP-TLS (Extensible Authentication Protocol -
Transport Layer Security) [18], EAP-TTLS (Tunneled Transport Layer Security)
[17], PEAP (Protected EAP) [19].
EAP-TLS was created by Microsoft and accepted by the IETF as RFC 2716: PPP
EAP TLS Authentication Protocol. EAP-TLS is the de facto standard for authen-
tication in 802.11i wireless LANs. It relies on certi¯cates on both the server and
the client side to deliver mutual authentication and secure key exchange, but it fails
to protect the client's identity from being disclosed. EAP-TTLS is a proprietary
protocol developed by Funk Software and Certicom, while PEAP is developed by
Microsoft, Cisco and RSA Security. Both EAP-TTLS and PEAP require only the
server certi¯cate to establish a TLS tunnel in stage one, and then authenticate
each other in stage two. But they are susceptible to DoS attacks because the
server requires to compute a signature upon receiving an authentication request
from any entity. Moreover, client identity con¯dentiality is not provided in PEAP.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Weaknesses in Two-Party Authentication and Key Exchange
Protocols for Wireless Networks
Protocols MA Anonymity DoS PFS Client-cert
Symmetric key WEP £ £ £ £






BCY £ £ £ £
AD £ £ £ £
ASK £ £ £ £ £
ZL £ £ £
BP £ £ £
PKC-based ASPeCT £ £
Protocols IKE £ £ £
JFK £
EAP-TLS £ £ £
EAP-TTLS £
PEAP £ £
2.3 Authentication and KeyManagement inWireless PAN
Bluetooth de¯nes several di®erent security levels that can be de¯ned for devices and
services. The devices have two trust levels, i.e. trusted and untrusted. The trusted level
requires a ¯xed and trusted relationship and it has unrestricted access to all services,
while the untrusted device doesn't have ¯xed relationship and its access to services is
limited. Meanwhile, three di®erent security modes are de¯ned in Bluetooth as follows:
² Mode 1: A non-secure mode in which a device will not initiate any security
² Mode 2: A service level enforced security mode which allows di®erent and °exible
access policies for di®erent applications
² Mode 3: A link level enforced security mode in which security procedures are
needed.
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The security procedures de¯ned in Bluetooth consists of three steps as illustrated in
Figure 2.5. In the ¯rst step, two units are turned on for the ¯rst time and generate their
own unit key based on its own address and a randomly generated number. Next, they
get in touch for the ¯rst time in order to establish a common secret key for following
contacts. Subsequently, they generate common secret keys and exchange data under the
protection of these keys.
Generation of Unit Key








Generation of Encryption Key
Encrypted communication
Generation of Unit Key
Unit A First Startup Unit B First Startup
Unit-Unit First Handshake
Unit-Unit following handshakes
Figure 2.5: Bluetooth Security Overview
2.3.1 Key Management
There are several kinds of keys in Bluetooth system to ensure secure transmission. The
most important key is the link key, which is used between two Bluetooth devices for
authentication purpose. After authentication, an encryption key is derived from the
link key and is used to secure the exchanged data between the two devices.
In Bluetooth, four link keys are generated during the security procedures:
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² Unit Keys KA and KB:
The device generates its own unit key (say KA and KB for the two devices) based
on its own BD ADDR (which is a unique address link the MAC address for
Ethernet cards) and a randomly generated number.
² Initialization Key Kinit:
In Unit-Unit First Handshake, an initialization key is generated between the two
units. The generation of this initialization key takes the Personal Identi¯cation
Number (PIN) and a random number as parameters.
² Combination key KAB:
Combination key KAB is derived from two units A and B using link key exchange.
This key is generated for each pair of devices and is used when more security is
needed.
² Master key Kmaster:
Master key Kmaster is used when the master device wants to transmit to several
devices at ones. It overrides the current link key only for one session.
After successful authentication, the encryption could be enabled and an encryption key
KC is generated for encrypting communication data. The relationship between link keys
and encryption key is illustrated in Figure 2.6.
2.3.2 Authentication
Authentication in Bluetooth employs the challenge-response scheme. It starts by issuing
a challenge to another device and it has to then send a response to that challenge which












































Figure 2.7: Bluetooth Authentication
authentication, encryption may be used to communicate. The authentication procedure
is illustrated in the Figure 2.7. During the process of Bluetooth authentication, unit B
sends its address to A ¯rst, and A replies with a random number AU RANDA. Then B
takes its address, AU RANDA, and the link key as the input to encryption function E1
to obtain a response SRES and ACO (authenticated ciphering o®set). SRES is then
sent to A for authentication.
2.3.3 Security Limitations of Bluetooth
Bluetooth has shown some weakness and limitation in its security speci¯cation. Firstly,
it su®ers from eavesdropping because the PIN has a small key space usually. The PIN
is usually a 4-digit one, which limits the key space to 10; 000 di®erent values. Hence the
attacker can guess all PINs and the correctness of each guess is veri¯ed by performing
the second step of the initialization protocol. Secondly, only the device not the user is
authenticated when the PIN code is stored on the bluetooth device. Therefore, if the
device is lost or stolen, any other person can get authenticated with the device. Also,
Bluetooth doesn't de¯ne authorization separately for each service.
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2.4 Authentication and KeyManagement inWireless WAN
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) [62] has emerged as the full-
°edged 3G wireless standards to support both the radio and network functions based
on the IMT-2000 framework. It is designed to deliver wireless services with better
performance than the 2G counterpart. Besides o®ering traditional voice communication,
3G data capability o®ers Internet and Intranet services for multimedia application, high-
speed business transaction and telemetry.
2.4.1 Security Mechanisms of UMTS
The security functions of UMTS are based on what have been implemented in GSM.
Some of the security functions have been added and some existing have been improved.
Encryption algorithm is stronger and included in base station (Node-B) to radio network
controller (RNC) interface , the application of authentication algorithms is stricter and
subscriber con¯dentially is tighter.
UMTS speci¯cation has ¯ve security feature groups [62]:
1. Network access security (I): the set of security features that provide users with se-
cure access to 3G services, and which in particular protect against attacks on the
(radio) access link. It includes user identity con¯dentiality, entity authentication,
con¯dentiality, data integrity and mobile equipment identi¯cation.
2. Network domain security (II): the set of security features that enable nodes in
the provider domain to securely exchange signalling data, and protect against
attacks on the wireline network;
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3. User domain security (III): the set of security features that secure access to
mobile stations
4. Application domain security (IV): the set of security features that enable appli-
cations in the user and in the provider domain to securely exchange messages.
5. Visibility and con¯gurability of security (V): the set of features that enables the
user to inform himself whether a security feature is in operation or not and
whether the use and provision of services should depend on the security feature.






















Figure 2.8: UMTS Security Architecture
TE|Terminal Equipment; USIM|User Service Identity Module; SN|Serving
Network; HN|Home Network; MT|Mobile Termination; AN|Access Network
2.4.2 Authentication and Key Management
We focus on authentication and key management mechanism of UMTS speci¯cation.
Authentication in UMTS adopts a challenge-response scheme similar to that of GSM.
After the mutual authentication, a new pair of cipher and integrity keys between the
VLR/SGSN and the USIM is established. The mechanism employed in UMTS to achieve
authentication and key management is shown in the following ¯gure 2.9.
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Figure 2.9: UMTS Authentication and Key Management
(AuC), Serving Network SN (VLR/SGSN) and Mobile Station MS (USIM). A pre-
shared master keyK between MS and HE is the basis of the authentication. A successful
authentication and key agreement procedure is as follows.
1. VLR/SGSN requests an Authentication Vector (AV) from the HLR.
2. HLR computes one or more AV. This is done by means of the authentication
algorithms and the users private secret key K. (K is only found in the HLR and
on the USIM).
3. HLR responds by sending n Authentication Vectors back to the requestor.
4. VLR/SGSN challenges the user/USIM by sending RAND and an Authentication
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token (AUTN).
5. The user/USIM processes the AUTN. The AUTN contains a sequence number
(SEQ), a message authentication code (MAC-A) and an authentication manage-
ment ¯eld (AMF). With the aid of the private secret key K, the user is able
to verify that the received challenge data could only have been constructed by
someone who had access to the same secret key K. The user/USIM will also verify
that the AV has not expired by checking the sequence number (SEQ). Provided
that the network can be authenticated and that the AV is still valid (fresh), the
user/USIM proceeds to generate the con¯dentiality key (CK), the integrity key
(IK) and the response (RES).
6. The user/USIM responds with the RES to the network.
7. The VLR/SGSN veri¯es that response is correct by comparing the expected re-
sponse (XRES) from the AV with the response (RES) received from the user/USIM.
After having established session keys (CK and IK) through the UMTS AKA proce-
dure, con¯dentiality and integrity protection services can be initiated. The con¯dential-
ity protection applies to both user data and the associated system signalling data.
2.4.3 Security Limitations of UMTS
Improved from GSM, UMTS provides much stronger security features than GSM. UMTS
provides security against using false base stations with mutual authentication. In UMTS,
encryption is extended from air interface only to include base station to radio network
controller connection. Security data in the UMTS network will be protected in data
storages and while transmitting ciphering keys and authentication data in the system.
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UMTS also provides mechanism for upgrading security features. But it also has a
number of security weaknesses.
Identity con¯dentiality is not absolute with authentication and key management of
UMTS. If the user is registering for the ¯rst time in the serving network, the permanent
user identity (IMSI) is sent in plaintext. An eavesdropper can intercept this message
and compromise the user's identity con¯dentiality.
Due to expensive computation cost of public key cryptography, UMTS does not
employ PKC in authentication and key management. This leads to the drawback of
lacking perfect forward secrecy in the authentication protocol. Once the pre-shared
master secret key is compromised, previous communication content is also disclosed.
Since the 3G systems have been deployed only for a relatively short time, their secu-
rity still needs more time to be tested. But its security features discussed above clearly
guarantee higher level of security than that of previous cellular telecommunication sys-
tems.
2.5 Group Key Management Schemes for Wireless Net-
works
As group-oriented applications are becoming more and more important, group key man-
agement schemes are required to keep communications among group members secure.
According to mechanisms by which the group key is generated, existing group key man-
agement schemes can be classi¯ed into two categories: group key distribution schemes
and group key agreement schemes.
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Group key distribution schemes rely on a centralized server or a group leader to
generate and distribute keys to group members. Since the entity responsible for key
generation and distribution could likely become the single point of failure as well as the
performance bottleneck, group key distribution schemes are not preferable in ad hoc
group communications. On the other hand, because the group key is selected by the
centralized server, the security of the group relies heavily on how good the group key is
selected by the server or the leader.
In group key agreement schemes, a group key is constructed from all the shares
contributed by every group member; therefore, such schemes avoid reliance on a single
entity for key generation. Group key agreement schemes can be subdivided into central-
ized schemes and distributed schemes. Centralized schemes use a centralized server for
group key management, while distributed group key agreement schemes do not require
the existence of a centralized server.
2.5.1 Group Key Distribution
Many conference distribution schemes, a variant of group key distribution, designed for
wireless communication systems have been shown to be insecure. The key distribution
scheme proposed by Tatebayashi et al. [59] is attacked in [56] because the scheme uses
a low exponent RSA. Based on the conference key distribution protocol [48] for the
wireless environment, a conference scheme with dynamic participation was proposed in
[49], and another one employing self encryption was proposed in [50]. But the former
[49] has been shown to be insecure in [55], and even worse, Bao showed both [49] and
[50] are vulnerable to a colluding attack and a passive attack in [47].
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The Logical Key Hierarchy(LKH) proposed by Wong et al. [71] and Wallner et al.
[73] are the ¯rst to introduce the tree structure into the group key management. In the
logical tree structure of LKH, each leaf node corresponds to a group member while the
root corresponds to the group key known only to the group members. An improvement
of LKH which is known as LKH+ [80] halves the size of rekeying messages. The One-way
Function Tree(OFT) proposed by McGrew and Sherman [69] improves the hierarchical
tree approach furthermore. In OFT, the key of the parent is derived from the keys of its
two children, and hence it reduces the size of the rekeying messages to half of the LKH.
Aware of ine±ciency of previous group key management schemes in communica-
tions, some solutions for group key distribution in wireless networks and ad hoc net-
works focus on achieving better performance in communications. Lazos and Poovendran
[88, 89] proposed a location-aware and a routing-aware key distribution scheme to ad-
dress the problem of e±ciently securing multicast communication for ad hoc networks.
The location-aware scheme employs an iterative clustering algorithm to construct a
key tree on which nodes located close to each other are clustered together. A variant
of K-means algorithm for creating appropriate clusters is introduced to divide group
members into clusters. The location-aware scheme requires an additional GPS system
to obtain each node's coordinates, and it requires complex computation to obtain the
key tree. Moreover, the resulting key tree may not be optimal since it does not con-
sider the position of the group controller. The routing-aware key distribution scheme
can build a routing-aware key tree with low complexity, but the e±ciency of the result-
ing key tree is far from that of the optimal key tree. Another group key distribution
scheme proposed in [87] uses codewords to represent paths and group nodes based on
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the length of the common path, which is derived from hamming distance of codewords.
Sun et al. [90] proposed a scalable multicast key management for wireless networks.
Noticing the localization of rekeying messages transmission, they proposed to construct
a topology-matching key management tree to yield e±ciency in communications. The
topology-matching key management tree they build has a three-layer hierarchy consist-
ing of mobile nodes, base stations and supervisor hosts. Since it is specially designed
for wireless LANs, the scheme is not well-suited for ad hoc networks.
2.5.2 Group Key Agreement
The earliest research e®ort on group key agreement is due to Ingemarsson et al. [51].
In their protocol, the group members are arranged in a logical ring, and the protocol
executes in (n ¡ 1) rounds. In each round, every group member raises the received
intermediate key value to the power of its own exponent and forwards the result to its
next member. Burmester and Desmedt proposed another group key agreement protocol
in [102]. The BD protocol takes only three rounds and two modular exponentiations
per member to generate a group key. However, at least half of the members need to
change their session random on every membership event, and it requires 2n broadcast
messages which is expensive on a wide area networks. The group Di±e-Hellman key
exchange protocol (GDH) [79] is extended from two-party Di±e-Hellman key exchange.
GDH provides fully contributory authenticated key agreement, but it is computation-
intensive as it requires O(n) cryptographic operations upon each key change.
Based on the tree structure, Kim et al. proposed the tree-based group Di±e-Hellman
(TGDH) key agreement protocol [75, 77]. TGDH, which provides great computation
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and communication e±ciency, combines the key tree technique and the Di±e-Hellman
exchange in a fully distributed way. Another group key agreement protocol named
STR [76] is an extreme form of TGDH since it is based on a completely imbalanced tree
structure. The authors of STR realized the importance of communication e±ciency in
the long delay networks and STR is aimed at reducing the communication rounds. But
the key tree of STR is also constructed without any relation to the network topology,
STR reduces the amount of key information needed for group key agreement at cost of
more computation e®orts. Of these group key agreement protocols, TGDH has been
shown to exhibit the best performance in both WAN and LAN settings [81]. Although
tree-based group key management schemes provide great e±ciency in computation, the
key trees constructed in these schemes are usually independent of the network topology,
which makes these schemes ine±cient in communication.
Therefore, we propose in this thesis an e±cient group key agreement scheme with
a novel key tree construction approach for wireless ad hoc networks. We present a
tree-transformation algorithm which constructs an e±cient key tree from the underly-
ing multicast tree of the ad hoc network. The algorithm transforms a multicast tree
into a binary key tree which localizes keying information transmission in group key
agreement. Our group key agreement scheme based on this key tree largely reduces the
communication cost while keeping the computation cost at a very low level.
2.5.3 Multi-party Password-based Protocols
Though multi-party password-based protocols (a.k.a. group PAKE protocols) o®er great
convenience for group-oriented applications, they only received very modest research
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e®ort.
In group password-based protocols, either the whole group share a single password,
or each client in the group shares an independent password with a trusted server. The
single-password setting is not preferable in real applications for several reasons. First,
if a client in the group leaves or the password of a client is compromised, the shared
password has to be updated, which could be a very expensive process. Moreover, com-
promise of any client leads to breakdown of the entire system. Secondly, individual client
identi¯cation is impossible in this setting. As a result, no one is able to distinguish one
client from another, and it is impossible for a subgroup of the group to securely establish
a session key and have secure communications. While the independent-password setting
avoids the above problems and re°ects more accurately what is happening in the real
world.
Under the single-password setting, Asokan and Ginzboorg [93] proposed a group
PAKE protocol for ad hoc networks. Bresson et al. [101] proposed another group PAKE
protocol and proved its security formally. While for the independent-password setting,
only a group PAKE protocol EKE-U [95] was proposed under this setting recently.
Although this protocol has a formal security proof, it is very ine±cient in computation
and communications. The protocol requires O(n) exponentiations on client side and
O(n2) exponentiations on server side. Moreover, each client requires to run a one-round
TF protocol with the server, which would incur too much communication overhead in
wireless networks.
Group PAKE protocols under the independent-password setting need more careful
treatment since they su®er from attacks which are not present under the single pass-
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word setting, such as attacks initiated by some colluding legitimate clients against other
clients' passwords. Not only should passwords be resistant to outsider attacks, but they
should be secure against insider attacks. Our group PAKE protocol to be presented
in this thesis, however, is designed to counter against all possible attacks under the
independent-password setting. Furthermore, our proposed protocol has much better
e±ciency in terms of communications and computation as it exploits a group key tree
structure for group key agreement. This protocol is well-suited for multi-hop wireless




Exchange in Wireless LANs
3.1 Introduction
The demand for access to wireless networks in public places, such as airport lounges,
college campuses and city centers, has surged dramatically over the recent few years.
This is mainly due to the growing popularity of mobile devices and the increasing per-
vasiveness of wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.11, HomeRF, HIPERLAN/2 and
Bluetooth. A major concern in wireless networking is security and in particular network
access control. Since deployment of wireless network technologies in public places bears
the danger of unauthorized users gaining access to network services, it is extremely im-
portant to be able to restrict access to the network only to authorized users. Therefore,
secure user authentication and authorization, and a reliable access control mechanism
are vital for wireless networks.
Two protocols which have similar two-layer access control architectures for wireless
networks in public places have been recently proposed in the literature. The ¯rst access
control protocol, called the Lancaster protocol [23,39], is designed for a wireless overlay
network around Lancaster city, UK; it employs user password for authentication and
enforces access control at the IP layer. However, the design °aws of the Lancaster
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protocol make it vulnerable to various attacks.
The second access control protocol, refereed to as the Stanford protocol [22], aims to
overcome several security de¯ciencies in 802.1X [34] and to provide access control in both
wireless and wired networks; it uses public key cryptosystems (PKC) for authentication
and performs access control at the link layer. Although this protocol is supposed to
resist DoS attacks, it is unfortunately susceptible to DoS attacks as well as to other
types of attacks.
The models of these two protocols are representative for access control in overlay
wireless access networks. Both models adopt a two-layer access control architecture, in
which a higher layer is responsible for authentication and key agreement while a lower
layer is responsible for per-packet access control. The di®erence of the two models is
the di®erent credentials on which the two protocols are based. The Lancaster protocol
relies on a secret password shared between the client and the server, while the Stanford
protocol depends on the certi¯cates of the client and the server for authentication and
access control. Password-based and certi¯cate-based access control protocols are two
di®erent approaches with di®erent advantages: the former approach is more convenient
and user-friendly, while the latter can o®er more security features like DoS resistance
and identity anonymity.
In this chapter, we discuss in detail the °aws of these two access control protocols
and propose two secure protocols in place of the Lancaster protocol and the Stanford
protocol, respectively. The ¯rst protocol proposed is a password-based protocol. It
provides great user-friendliness and convenience for clients since no PKC infrastructure
but weak passwords are required on the client side. Our second protocol, which is a PKC-
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based protocol, is designed for wireless networks where PKC infrastructure is available.
Other than mutual authentication and secure key exchange, our PKC-based protocol
provides more protection for wireless networks: it employs the cookie mechanism to
defend against DoS attacks, while protects clients' identities from disclosure to o®er
identity con¯dentiality for clients. Compared with other PKC-based protocols, our
protocol provides better resistance to DoS attacks while avoiding their weaknesses.
3.2 Password-based Authentication and Key Exchange for
Wireless Networks
In this section, we ¯rst review the Lancaster access control architecture considered in
[23,39], and present the Lancaster protocol designed for the architecture; we discuss its
security weaknesses and then introduce our protocol for the access control architecture.
Both the Lancaster protocol and our protocol use user password for authentication
and key exchange. Password based scheme is still the dominate approach for user
authentication, this is particularly true for mobile users who may regularly employ
a number of di®erent devices as well as many di®erent points of network access.
3.2.1 The Lancaster Access Control Architecture
The Lancaster access control architecture [23,39] is for publicly accessible wireless over-
lay networks. It is designed to address the problem of ubiquitous Internet service provi-
sioning within the city of Lancaster. The Lancaster access control architecture, shown
in Fig. 3.1, is composed of a number of base stations connected with access routers,
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which in turn connect to the authentication server via a gateway. This approach is in
fact a two-layer architecture where the authentication server is responsible for client
authentication and authorization, while access routers control access to the protected







Figure 3.1: The Lancaster Access Control Architecture.
Under the Lancaster architecture, it is assumed that a client holds a secret password
corresponding to the client's identity, and shares the password with the authentication
server. The authentication server has a private and public key pair and the public key
is made known to all the clients. In addition, the access routers have their private and
public key pairs with the public keys made available to the authentication server.
3.2.2 Security Requirements
Before proceeding with the description of password based authentication and access
control protocols, we list below a number of security requirements for such protocols.
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² Mutual Authentication: Authentication of the client to the authentication server
and authentication of the server to the client. The network want to be sure that it
is communicating with a genuine client; otherwise there is a danger that spurious
client will be able to fraudulently gain a level of service without ever intending
to pay for the service. Authentication of the authentication server to the client is
also necessary in order to prevent a type of man-in-the-middle attack as described
in [30].
² Key Authentication and Key Con¯rmation: Key authentication requires that only
the legitimate participants in the protocol but no other entity possess the agreed
secret key, while key con¯rmation means that both parties in the protocol can be
assured that both of them derive the same secret key.
² Key Freshness: The protocol should guarantee that the newly constructed session
key shared between the two parties has never been used in previous sessions.
Otherwise, a compromised old session key can lead to disclosure of subsequent
exchanges between the two parties.
² Perfect Forward Secrecy: Previous session keys and con¯dential messages should
be protected against compromise of the passwords and other long-term secrets.
² Secure Against Dictionary Attacks: Since passwords must be memorable, a secure
password based protocol should resist brute-force guessing, or dictionary attacks.
² Access Control: Only authorized clients can obtain access to the wireless network.
To protect from the parking lot attacks [7], ¯ne grained access control, ideally on
a per packet level, should be enforced.
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3.2.3 The Lancaster Protocol and Its Security Analysis
The Lancaster protocol, as illustrated in Fig. 3.2, consists of three messages.
1. To access the network, a client initiates the process by sending an authentication
request to the authentication server via an access router:
ES(MACC ; IPC ;K; Username; Password) (3.1)
where MACC , IPC , Username and Password are the client's MAC address,
IP address, username and password, respectively, and K is a secret session key
generated by the client. This request is encrypted with the public key of the
authentication server.
2. Upon receiving the authentication request, the authentication server decrypts
it using its private key. It checks the received password with the one in its
database. If the two passwords match, the client is considered authentic. The
authentication server then generates an authentication token Token, encrypts it
using the session key K and sends the ciphertext to the client:
eK(Token) (3.2)
3. Next, the authentication server encrypts the client's MAC address, IP address,
the access token and the session key with the access router's public key, and sends
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the result to the access router:
EAR(K;Token;MACC ; IPC) (3.3)
The access router decrypts this message and stores MACC , IPC , Token and K









Figure 3.2: The Lancaster Protocol.
When the client sends a packet to the network, it includes an access control extension
header in the IP packet as illustrated in Fig. 3.3. This header contains the access token
and a checksum both encrypted with the session key K using a symmetric key cipher.
In Fig. 3.3, V denotes the protocol version, T denotes the type of services, and Res
denotes the reserved bits.
MAC Header IPv6 Header PayloadHop-by-Hop Option
T Res. Access Token ChecksumV
Access Control Extension Header
Figure 3.3: The Packet Header Format in the Lancaster Protocol.
The access router checks packets from the clients (i.e., the wireless network) for
purpose of access control. When a packet is received from the wireless network, the
50
access router looks up the MAC address in the ACL. If an entry for the client device
exists, the access router veri¯es the IP source address. In the case of a match, it decrypts
the access token and the checksum using the session key and validates its content against
the ACL. When successful, the access control extension header is stripped o® and the
packet is passed on. Packets that fails any of those tests are dropped. One exception to
this rule is that when a client is ¯rst seen in a cell, it is allowed to contact certain well-
known IP addresses; this allows clients to initially communicate with the authentication
server.
The Lancaster protocol is simple in design, with only two message exchanges between
a client and the authentication server and one message sent from the authentication
server to an access router. Unfortunately, it has many serious security °aws which make
it vulnerable to various attacks.
First of all, the protocol does not follow the well-known \challenge-response" prin-
ciple. Speci¯cally, message (3.1) is not sent in response to any challenge from the
authentication server. This makes the protocol subject to replay attacks. Obviously,
message (3.1) can be replayed by anyone to the authentication server and the server will
accept the message and believes the sender as authentic. This design °aw can lead to
severe vulnerabilities as discussed below.
If the attacker is able to compromise just one session key K, he can replay message
(3.1) to request authentication, and then with the knowledge of the session key the
attacker can obtain the access token by decrypting message (3.2). Employing techniques
of IP spoo¯ng and MAC spoo¯ng, the attacker can then gain full access to the wireless
network with the access token. This attack can be easily launched by modifying outgoing
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packets' IP header and MAC header. The attacker can perform this attack any time he
wishes to with the knowledge of just one session key even he does not know the client
password at all.
The replay attack also leads to DoS attacks for the system. An attacker can collect
a large number of authentication requests (i.e. message (3.1)) from di®erent clients,
and replays them to the authentication server during a short period of time. Every
authentication request will engage the authentication server into expensive computation,
including two public key operations and a symmetric key operation. What is more
serious is that this attack would prevent the valid clients from accessing the wireless
network. After the attack replays a previous authentication request of a client to the
server, the server sends the third message to the access router to update the ACL
information of the client. Hence the valid client cannot access the wireless network
because he does not know which session key and access token the access router uses for
performing access control. This attack is serious since an attacker can prevent many
valid clients from access the wireless network without any knowledge. Besides, this also
leads to a severe computation-DoS attack against the server.
Secondly, since the password space is normally small, the attacker can perform dic-
tionary attacks against message (3.1) if any session key is exposed to the attacker. And
this attack can disclose the client's password. The attacker can simply selects a trial
password Password0 from the password dictionary exhaustively, and computes an en-
crypted message ES(MACC ; IPC ;K; Username; Password0) to compare with the inter-
cepted message (3.1). But this dictionary attack can be prevented by using a PKCS#1
public key encryption algorithm.
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Thirdly, the protocol does not provide key con¯rmation for both parties. Neither
party is ensured that the other party shares the same secret session key. In message
(3.2), Token is selected and encrypted with K by the server, hence the client is unable
to con¯rm that they share the same session key K. Also, key freshness is not guaranteed
in the protocol. There is no mechanism to prevent reuse of old session keys. If the client
reuses a previously used session key, the server will simply accept this old key. This
leads to the failure of the protocol when only one session key is compromised.
An even more serious security loophole is message (3.3) which carries no authentica-
tion information about its sender and the message itself has no freshness protection. As
a result, an attacker just generates a key K and an access token; he then encrypts the
key, the token, a mobile device's MAC and IP addresses using the access router's public
key to obtain EAR(K;Token;MACC ; IPC), sends the ciphertext to the access router,
and starts to access the network service with the mobile device. However, this attack
can be easily prevented by using a signature [23] or a secure tunnel as in our password
based protocol.
Moreover, the technical details of the access control extension header shown in Fig.
3.3 is not clearly spelled out in [23, 39]. Since the client and the access router share
a secret session key K, the use of the access token is not clear. We note that the
combined use of checksum and symmetric key encryption as in the Lancaster protocol
is dangerous if not designed carefully [10], [11]. The description on the construction of
the access control extension header in [23,39] does not provide enough technical details
for us to make creditable analysis.
53
3.2.4 Our Protocol for the Lancaster Architecture
As discussed earlier, the intrinsic characteristics of PAKE protocols lead to their inca-
pability of providing client identity protection and susceptibility against DoS attacks.
In this section, we propose a secure protocol to meet all the requirements.
Before the protocol starts, the client and the server agree on a set of security pa-
rameters: a multiplicative group Z¤p, its subgroup Gp;q of order q and a generator g of
Gp;q, where p; q are large prime numbers. Speci¯cally, p is selected as a safe prime or
a secure prime, which means that p = 2q + 1 or p = 2qr + 1 where all the factors of
r are comparable to q (otherwise the scheme would be insecure against Pohlig-Hellman
attack.). Assuming that discrete logarithm problem over Gp;q is hard.
Before a client can access network services, it performs the following authentication
and key agreement with the authentication server. The protocol message exchanges are























Figure 3.4: Our Anonymous DoS-Resistant Access Control Protocol.
1. The client C chooses a random number x 2R Zq and computes the exponential
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(gx)P encrypted with its password. Then he sends
(gx)P (3.4)
to the server, where C is the identity of the client. Since the exponential gx is
randomly generated, dictionary attacks are not applicable to disclose the client's
password.
2. After the server receives the ¯rst message, he chooses a random number y 2R Zq
and the exponential gy. He computes a hash HHK(gy; (gx)P ) with a hash key
HK private to the server only. Then the server sends
S; gy;HHK(gy; (gx)P ) (3.5)
to the client.
In this step, the server should avoid expensive computation in order to resist
DoS attacks, because the server cannot determine whether the client is valid.
Actually the computation cost of the server includes an exponentiation and a hash
computation in this message. But the server can generate the random exponential
beforehand or periodically, so that the computation cost of the server is only a
light-weight hash computation. In this message, HK is a hash key known only
by the server, and it is updated frequently to prevent accidental disclosure. As a
result, the hash HHK(gy; (gx)P ) can serve as an authenticator and a cookie that
would be sent back by the client in the next message.
3. After the client receives the above message, he computes the session key k =
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H(CjSjgxy) and then a hash Hk(gy; (gx)P ). Then he fetches the server's public
key to encrypt his identity C, his MAC address MACC , a random nonce NC ,
and the hash, and then he sends
(gx)P ;HHK(gy; (gx)P );
ESfC;MACC ; NC ;Hk(gy; (gx)P )g (3.6)
to the server.
In this step, the client derives the session key k by Di±e-Hellman computation,
which provides perfect forward secrecy for the protocol. The hashHHK(gy; (gx)P )
which serves as an authenticator as well as the two exponentials is sent back to
the server so that the server does not need to store the two exponentials but
still can verify that the two exponentials are not modi¯ed by checking the hash.
Hence the server can resist DoS attacks that intend to deplete the server's stor-
age space. The client's identity is protected with the server's public key to avoid
identity disclosure.
4. After the server receives the above message, it veri¯es the validity of the hash
HHK(gy; (gx)P ) by looking up the hash value in its storage. If the hash value
is stored on the server, then the server can verify whether the two exponen-
tials are valid by checking the received hash. After that, the server decrypts
ES(C;MACC ; NC ;Hk(gy; (gx)P )) and fetch the client's password according to
his identity. The server now can decrypts (gx)P to obtain gx and computes the
session key k in the same way as the client. At the end, the server assigns an IP
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address IPC to the client and sends the following message to the client.
ek(C;S; IPC ; gy; (gx)P ) (3.7)
In order for access control at the access point, the server also sends the session
key k, the client's MAC address and IP address to the access point through a
secure channel.
After successful authentication and key agreement, the enforcement of access control
in our protocol uses an access control extension header. Speci¯cally, we follow the
approach of the Authentication Header in IPSec [27]. Our access control extension
header is shown in Fig.3.5, where the Integrity Check Value (ICV) is a keyed hash
function output given by
ICV = Hk(MACHeaderjjIPv6Headerjj
V jjT jjResjjPayload):
Here V denotes protocol version, T denotes the type of service, and Res denotes the
reserved bits.
The ICV is computed by the client C for every IP packet it sends to the network,
and this provides integrity and data origin authentication for the IP packet. It can also
be used to provide protection against replays by incorporating a sequence number in
the extension header [27].
When an IP packet is received from the wireless network, the access router looks
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MAC Header IPv6 Header PayloadExtension Header
T Res. ICVV
Access Control Extension Header
Figure 3.5: The Packet Header Format in Our Protocol.
up the MAC address in the ACL. If the entry exists for the client device, the access
router fetches the secret session key, computes the ICV over the appropriate ¯elds of
the received packet, using the same formula as the client, and veri¯es that it is the same
as the ICV included in the received packet. If the veri¯cation is successful, the access
control extension header containing the ICV is stripped o® and the packet is passed on;
otherwise, the packet is dropped silently.
3.2.5 Security Analysis of Our Protocol
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol and show that our protocol
ful¯lls all the requirements aforementioned, including client identity con¯dentiality and
resistance to DoS attacks.
Mutual authentication between the client and the server is achieved after successful
protocol execution. The server authenticates the client by verifying the hashHk(gy; (gx)P )
encrypted with the server's public key in message (3.6), since only the legitimate client
knows x and can compute the session key k. On the other hand, because only the valid
server can decrypt the ciphertext in message (3.6) and know the client's identity, the
client can authenticate the server by checking message (3.7). At the same time, both
parties are ensured that the other party obtains the same session k as himself.
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Our protocol provides perfect forward secrecy by employing Di±e-Hellman key ex-
change, and this ensures security of previous sessions even when the shared password or
the server's private key is compromised. With the secret password P , an adversary who
has stored previous communication content can decrypt (gx)P from previous session. If
the server's private key is compromised, the adversary can discover the client's identity.
But in both cases, it is still computationally infeasible for the adversary to obtain k
assuming the hardness of discrete logarithm. So the adversary still cannot derive the
session key and in turn cannot disclose previous communication.
In our protocol, the identity of the client is protected against both passive and
active attacks. After the client receives message (3.5), it fetches the public key of
the server according to the server's identity, and sends its identity encrypted by the
server's public key. Hence only the valid server who holds the corresponding private
key can decrypt it to obtain the client's identity. Later in message (3.7), the client's
identity is protected with the session key k. Since a passive attacker cannot complete
Di±e-Hellman computation to derive k, he cannot obtain any information about the
client's identity. On the other hand, an active attacker has no legitimate private key
to decrypt the identity information in message (3.6), and he cannot complete Di±e-
Hellman exchange to derive k to decrypt message (3.7) either. Therefore, both passive
and active attacks cannot disclose the client's identity. However, it should note that the
MAC address of the client's machine can be used to identify the client if he always uses
the same machine. Only if the client is capable of changing his MAC address can he
keep him totally anonymous to outsiders.
The shared password is secure against o®-line dictionary attacks in our protocol. In
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the protocol, the password is used to encrypt the random exponential gx generated by
the client, and hence an adversary cannot verify his guess because he does not know gx.
If the adversary impersonates as the server, and sends an exponential gy
0
to the client.
The client then will derive the session key k0 = H(CjSjgxy0), which can be computed by
the adversary who has y0. However, the adversary cannot verify his guess by checking
ESfC;MACC ; NC ;Hk(gy; (gx)P )g because NC is a random nonce chosen by the client.
The server does not have to keep any state and commit any storage when sending
out message (3.5), and this relieves the server from memory DoS attacks that intend to
exhaust the server's memory. The two exponentials will be sent back in message (3.6),
so the server does not need to create state and store these information. Hence, if the
client is fraudulent, the server will not have committed any storage resources. In order
to avoid the case in which the exponentials may be modi¯ed, the server uses a secret
hash key HK to compute an authenticator HHK(gy; (gx)P ). The key HK is private
to the server and is updated frequently, and the authenticator sent back in message
(3.6) can be used to ensure that the exponentials are the same as those in (3.5). On
the other hand, the server is also protected from computation DoS attacks aiming to
exhaust the server's computation resource. In message (3.5), the server's computation
cost includes only a cryptographic hash operation and an exponential gy. Note that the
random exponential gy can be computed beforehand or periodically computed when the
server is lightly computational burdened. That is, the server only commits itself into
expensive computation upon successful veri¯cation of HHK(gy; (gx)P ) after receiving
message (3.6), and this e®ectively reduces threat of DoS attacks by delaying the server's
computation to the last round. Moreover, when the server is under the computation
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DoS attack and heavily burdened in computation, the server can reuse previously used
exponential gy. While if the adversary launches a computation DoS attack by °ooding
message (3.6) to the server, the server just resends message (3.7) to the other party.
Only the authorized client who has the valid password P can establish a secret key
K with the authentication server and in turn with an access router. Since only the
client with K can compute ICV for an IP packet, only the client can access the network
services. Note that the ICV is computed over the MAC header and the entire IP packet;
hence, any modi¯cation to the MAC header and the IP packet during transmission will
be detected by the access router. This ensures that only authorized parties can gain
access to the wireless network.
3.2.6 Implementation and Performance Analysis
While providing desirable features for wireless networks, our protocol also achieves great
computation e±ciency for wireless networks. In our protocol, the server only needs 2
exponentiations and 1 public key decryption, and the client requires to compute 2 expo-
nentiations and 1 public key encryption. We evaluate the performance of our protocol
by measuring the overhead of our protocol. The overhead incurred by our access control
protocol consists of two parts. The ¯rst part of the overhead comes from authentication
and key exchange of the protocol. Before a client can access the wireless network, it
needs to follow the protocol with the authentication server to agree on a session key for
each session. This part of overhead is associated with every session. Thereafter, the
client uses the session key to encrypt and authenticate every packet, while the access
router veri¯es every packet from the client with the same session key. The delay of the
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Table 3.1: Benchmarks for Cryptographic Operations
450MHz P III 1 2.1GHz P IV
Modular Exp. 8:80ms 3:69ms
RSA Dec/Sig 17:00ms 4:63ms
RSA Enc/Ver 0:81ms 0:18ms
HMAC/MD5 480Mb/s 1726Mb/s
AES 243Mb/s 496Mb/s
1The benchmarks come from [5,38,40] and [43].
packet processing leads to the second part of the overhead for the wireless network, and
it is associated with every packet.
We implement our protocol on the network simulator ns2 to evaluate the performance
of our protocol. In our implementation, we adopt the benchmarks for the cryptographic
operations on two di®erent hardware platforms. One is a 450MHz Pentium III proces-
sor [5, 38, 40], and the other is a 2.1GHz Pentium IV processor [43]. The processing
times of the required cryptographic operations, such as modular exponentiation, RSA
decryption/signature and encryption/veri¯cation, are listed in table 3.1. These bench-
marks are also used to evaluate our PKC-based protocol later. We assume the following
system setup for performance evaluation of our protocol: AES is used for encryption
and HMAC/MD5 is used for ICV calculation; the bandwidth of the wireless network is
1Mb/s; the random nonces NC and NS , the exponents, the identity of each party are
160-bit long; the modulus p is 1,024-bit long.
For the ¯rst part of the overhead, the time on hash computation, random number
generation, modular multiplication and modular inversion can be ignored, since it is
relatively much smaller than the time on Di±e-Hellman key-pair generation and key
agreement.
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After successful authentication and key exchange, the client obtains the session key
to secure its subsequent communications. With the session key, every packet is en-
crypted and an integrity check value (ICV) of the packet is calculated for the purpose
of authentication. After the packet is received by the access router, the router decrypts
the packet and computes the ICV of the packet for authentication. These operations
incur the second part of overhead for our protocol.
We simulate the protocol and obtain the overhead of sessions with 1000 1000-bytes
packets. The total overhead of our protocol is calculated and listed in table 3.2. As seen
from the table, the total overhead of our protocol takes up only 3:77% for the 450MHz
Pentium III and 2:86% for the 2.1GHz Pentium IV of the total time. Therefore, our
protocol can be used to secure wireless communications with degrading the performance
slightly.
Table 3.2: Overhead of Our Password Based Protocol
450MHz P III 2.1GHz P IV
Overhead/Session 53.0ms/14.6ms 1 19.6ms/14.6ms
Overhead/Packet 0.099ms/0.195ms 0.050ms/0.195ms
Total Overhead 2 (67:6 + n ¢ 0:294)ms (34:2 + n ¢ 0:245)ms
Total Overhead 3 3:77% 2:86%
1The data is in form of computation/transmission time.
2The total overhead of a n-packet session.
3The total overhead of a 1000-packet session as a percentage of the total time.
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3.3 PKC-based Authentication and Key Exchange for Wire-
less Networks
In the last section, we focused on password based access control protocols. Such pro-
tocols are easy to use especially for mobile users who move from one device to another
device. In this section, we are concerned with access control protocols based on public
key cryptosystem (PKC). For this purpose, we ¯rst review the Stanford access control
architecture and protocol as proposed by Faria and Cheriton [22]. We then point out
some weaknesses in the Stanford protocol and present our access control protocol.
3.3.1 The Stanford Access Control Architecture
Faria and Cheriton [22] introduced a PKC-based two-layer architecture (see Fig. 3.6)
for secure access to wireless 802.11 networks. The protocol stack of the architecture is
composed of a Secure Internet Access Protocol (SIAP) and a Secure Link Access Protocol
(SLAP). The SIAP, running at the application layer, provides mutual authentication and
sets up fresh session keys between the SIAP client and SIAP server, while the SLAP,
running on top of the data link layer, is responsible for data link access control using the
session keys negotiated by SIAP. The SIAP/SLAP protocol stack resides at client devices
and 802.11 access points. Therefore, there is no centralized authentication server as in
the Lancaster architecture; the functionality of the authentication server is distributed















Figure 3.6: The Stanford Access Control Architecture.
3.3.2 Security Requirements
In addition to the requirements as given in Section 3.2.2, it is possible to design a PKC-
based protocol to protect identity of the client and resist denial of service (DoS) attacks.
That is,
² Client Identity Con¯dentiality: Con¯dentiality protection of a client's identity
against both passive and active attacks;
² Protection Against DoS Attacks: The protocol should have certain built-in reme-
dies to reduce the e®ect of DoS attacks aiming to exhaust the server's computation
resource (computation-DoS) or storage resource (memory-DoS).
The requirement of identity con¯dentiality, or identity anonymity, originates from
the movement of the mobile nodes. In the wireless environment, the current location
and the movement of a roaming user are important parts of the user's privacy, and
they should be protected during communications. Knowing the user's identity helps the
attacker to locate the user and track his movement, so it is important for a protocol in
a wireless environment to provide identity con¯dentiality to users.
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With password based protocols it is di±cult to protect a client's identity since the
authentication server needs to know the client's identity to match against the client's
password. The asymmetric nature of PKC, however, allows us to overcome this di±culty
by encrypting the client's identity with the public key of the authentication server.
3.3.3 The SIAP/SLAP Protocol and Its Security Analysis
In the Stanford access control architecture, the Stanford protocol is intended to provide
DoS protection but without the identity con¯dentiality for the wireless network. In
their protocol, the SIAP protocol establishes secret session keys between a client and an
access point, and then the session keys are passed to the SLAP, where the key is used
for access control at the link layer.
To access the wireless network, a client C runs the SIAP with a SIAP server S (which
resides at an access point) as follows.
1. The client C initiates the protocol by sending
ver;msg id (3.8)
to the SIAP server S, where ver is the protocol version andmsg id is the message
identi¯er.
2. The server responds with a signed nonce NS and its public key certi¯cate CertS
signed by a well known certi¯cation authority,
SS(ver;msg id;NS); NS ; CertS : (3.9)
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3. After the client receives the above message, it ¯rst veri¯es the validity of the
SIAP's public key using the public key of the certi¯cation authority and then
veri¯es the validity of the signature using SIAP's public key. The client generates
a nonce NC and sends
SC(ver;msg id;NC ; NS ;MACC); NC ; CertC (3.10)
to the SIAP server. In this message, CertC is the client's public key certi¯cate
andMACC stands for the client's MAC address which can be extracted from the
header of the data link packet.
4. Upon reception and successful veri¯cation of the client's signature, the server
sends
SS(ver;msg id;NC ; IPC ; EC(K); T );
IPC ; EC(K); T (3.11)
to the client. In this message, K is a secret value from which the client and the
server generates session encryption key and integrity key, EC(K) is the encryption
of K using the client's public key, IPC is the IP address assigned to the client by
the server, and T is a ticket which is used to propagate its state to other servers
in the network. The function of the ticket T is not discussed since it is out of the
scope of this Chapter.
5. The client veri¯es the server's signature in the above message, and if the result
is positive, the SIAP execution is considered successful. At this point, the client
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and the server each generates an encryption key and an integrity key based on
K and passes the two keys from SIAP to SLAP for the purpose of access control
at the data link layer.
The complete protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3.7.





Figure 3.7: The SIAP Protocol.
After successful execution of SIAP between the client and the server, the generated
keys, including an encryption key and an integrity key, are passed from SIAP to SLAP.
As the client is sending out packets, the IP header and the payload of every packet are
encrypted using AES with the encryption key, and then an integrity check value (ICV)
is calculated over SLAP header, IP header and the payload using HMAC-MD5 with the
integrity key. The ICV is copied into the MAC header of the packet. The packet after
processed by SLAP is illustrated in Fig. 3.8.
MAC Header SLAP PayloadIP Header
Encryption
Authentication (ICV)
Figure 3.8: The SLAP Packet
For each packet received by the server, the server fetches the integrity key and
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encryption key corresponding to the sender's MAC address. If the integrity check of
the packet is successful, the server proceeds to decrypt the encrypted part, and pass the
packet to the intranet. As a result, only authorized packets can pass the check and be
delivered to the intranet.
The SIAP provides certain resistance to DoS attacks in the sense that SIAP servers
are distributed among access points. However, individual SIAP server is defenseless
against both computation-DoS and memory-DoS attacks. The computation-DoS attack
can be carried out simply by sending a large number of message (3.8) to the SIAP
server. Each message (3.8) will launch the server into computational expensive signature
generation operations.
The SIAP does not possess perfect forward secrecy since the secret K is encrypted by
the client's public key. Once the client's private key is compromised, all the past session
keys are exposed and all past communication content is revealed. To o®er perfect forward
secrecy in the protocol, a Di±e-Hellman key exchange is needed as in our PKC-based
protocol proposed later.
Lastly, in SIAP, the client's public key certi¯cate is sent in clear, therefore it does not
provide client identity anonymity. The identity information can be used by an attacker
to locate a mobile node and track its movement.
3.3.4 Our Protocol for the Stanford Architecture
Aware of the design °aws of the Stanford protocol, we present a PKC-based authenti-
cation and key exchange protocol to replace it. The Internet draft, JFKi [1], has been
proposed as an e±cient, DoS-resistant key exchange protocol for Internet, and it also
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provides active identity protection for the initiator (i.e., the client). The JFKi protocol
employs a cookie mechanism in dealing with DoS attacks, and we borrow this mechanism
to build a new protocol for access control in wireless networks. Compared with JFKi,
the server in our protocol requires less computation before a round trip of messages
are transmitted, and our protocol can protect the client's identity from disclosure even
when secret exponents are disclosed. Hence, our protocol o®ers better resistance to DoS
attacks and stronger identity protection.
As de¯ned in Section III, let Gp;q be a large multiplicative group, over which the
discrete logarithm problem is hard. Let g be a generator of Gp;q. Our protocol is
composed of four message exchanges as follows.
1. The client generates a nonce NC , a random value x 2R Z¤q , computes the expo-
nential gx and sends
NC ; g
x (3.12)
to the SIAP server. The exponential gx is used for Di±e-Hellman exchange to
provide perfect forward secrecy, while the nonce NC allows the client to reuse the
same exponential gx in di®erent sessions. In order to o®er user identity con¯den-
tiality, no information related to the client's identity exists in this message. And
this message is not authenticated and could be sent by an attacker who aims to
mount a DoS attack.
2. Upon receipt of the above message, the server chooses its own nonce NS , a
random value y 2R Z¤q and the corresponding exponential gy. The it calculates
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an authenticator using a local secret HK and sends
NC ; NS ; g
y; S;HHK(gxjjgyjjNC jjNS jjMACC) (3.13)
to the client.
In this message, MACC is the client's MAC address, and HK is a secret
hash key known only to the server and is updated frequently by the server. The
HHK(gyjjNC jjNS jjMACC) functions as an authenticator and a cookie to be sent
back by the client in the next message, and it enables the server not to store the
two nonces and the two exponentials. When the authenticator, the two nonces
and the two exponentials are sent back by the client in the message (3.14), the
server checks the authenticator and is ensured that the two nonces and two
exponentials are the same as in the message (3.13). The key pair (y; gy) can
be generated and stored by the server beforehand (or periodically), hence the
server does not need to create any state at this stage and avoids the threat of
memory-DoS attacks.
In order to resist computation-DoS, the server cannot perform computation-
ally expensive operations since the server cannot determine whether the client
is legitimate. By producing the exponential gy periodically and reusing them
when exhausted, the server needs minimal computation at this stage, including
only a cryptographic hash function and the generation of a random nonce. As
a result, computation-DoS attacks against our protocol are not e®ective at this
point. Moreover, the server does not sign the exponential as in JFKi, and this
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alleviate the server's computation e®ort in this step. Hence our protocol provides
better resistance against DoS attacks than JFKi.
3. After receiving the above message, the client completes Di±e-Hellman computa-
tion to derive gxy. Then the client computes a signature over the nonces NC ; NS ,
the exponentials gx; gy, gxy and the server's identity S. After that, the client
encrypts this signature and the client's identity with the server's public key, and
sends the ciphertext, the authenticator, the two nonces, and the two exponentials
to the server as follows:
NC ; NS ; g
x;HHK(gxjjgyjjNC jjNS jjMACC);
ES(C;SC(NC ; NS ; gx; gy; gxy; S)): (3.14)
In this message, the two nonces and the two exponentials need to be sent back
to the server because the server does not keep state for these information. The
authenticator is used by the server to verify that the nonces and the exponentials
are not substituted by an attacker. The identity and the signature of the client
are encrypted with the server's public key so as to achieve identity anonymity
for the client.
4. Upon receiving the above message, the server ¯nds the stored key pair (y; gy) with
gy, and veri¯es the two nonces and the two exponentials against the authentica-
tor. If the veri¯cation is successful, the server decrypts the part encrypted with
its public key to obtain the client's identity and the signature. Then the server
completes the Di±e-Hellman computation to derive gxy, and so it can authenti-
72
cate the client by the signature with the client's public key. After that, the server
derives the session key as follows:
K = H(gxyjjNC jjNS);
and sends following message,
eK(IPC ; SS(IPC ; NC ; NS ; gx; gy; gxy; C)) (3.15)
to the client, where IPC is the IP address assigned to the client by the server.
Before sending this message, the server is not authenticated by the client yet.
Therefore, a signature of the server is sent in this message to authenticate the
server to the client. In order to provide identity con¯dentiality for the client, the
signature and the IP address IPC are encrypted with the derived session key K.
And that provides key con¯rmation for our protocol as well.
5. Upon receipt of this message, the client computes the session keyK = H(gxyjjNC jjNS),
and decrypts the message to obtain the IP address and the signature. Then the
client veri¯es the signature, and the server is authenticated if the signature passes
the veri¯cation. Finally, both the server and the client will pass the session key
from the SIAP to the SLAP for access control at the data link layer.
After the server and client derive the same session key and pass the session key from
the SIAP to the SLAP, every packet sent from the client to the server will be encrypted
and authenticated with the session key. The packet format is the same as the one in
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Fig. 3.8.
The complete protocol is illustrated in Fig. 3.9.
















Figure 3.9: Our Protocol for the Stanford Architecture.
3.3.5 Security Analysis of Our Protocol
Our protocol is intended to provide mutual authentication, key authentication, key
con¯rmation, key freshness, access control, perfect forward secrecy, client identity con-
¯dentiality and DoS resistance for wireless communications.
Mutual authentication is guaranteed by verifying the each other's signature. The
client is authenticated to the server in the third message (3.14) by providing a signature
SC(NC ; NS ; gx; gy; gxy; S) to the server. On the other hand, the client can authenticate
the server by verifying the encrypted signature SS(IPC ; NC ; NS ; gx; gy; gxy; C) sent by
the server in message (3.15). Both signatures are computed over two nonces and two
random exponentials, so a reply attack is impossible to get an attacker authenticated
successfully.
Our protocol also provides key authentication and key con¯rmation. The client can
be ensured that the exponential gy does indeed belong to a valid server by verifying the
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signature in message (3.15). Also the server can verify the signature SC(NC ; NS ; gx; gy; gxy; S)
in message (3.14) to be ensured that the exponential gx is indeed generated by a valid
client. Implicit key con¯rmation is provided in the protocol in that both parties need
to decrypt and verify the information protected by the session key K. This guarantees
that both parties hold the same session key K.
Both the client and the server contribute to the session key K. As a result, the
random nonces and exponentials chosen by the two parties ensure that the session key
K is di®erent every time, and hence guarantees key freshness for our protocol.
In the protocol, Di±e-Hellman exchange is employed to derive the session keys and
hence provides perfect forward secrecy for our protocol. In the case that an adversary
compromises the long-term secrets of both parties (i.e., the private keys of both parties),
the adversary still cannot gain any useful information about past session keys. With the
private keys of both parties, an adversary can decrypt the encrypted part in message
(3.14), but this does not help the adversary to recover past session keys in any sense.
Since the session keys are derived by Di±e-Hellman exchange between the client and
the server in our protocol, it is infeasible for the adversary to recover past session keys
under the assumption of hardness of discrete logarithm problem. Moreover, the amount
of forward secrecy can be traded o® against the resistance to DoS attacks [1]. When the
server is under DoS attacks, it can reuse previous exponentials to mitigate the threat of
the attacks by sacri¯cing some amount of perfect forward secrecy. Otherwise, the server
can use di®erent exponentials for each time to achieve perfect forward secrecy.
In our protocol, the identity of the client is protected against both passive and active
attacks. After the client receives message (3.13), it fetches the public key of the server
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according to the server's identity, and sends its identity encrypted by the server's public
key. Hence only the valid server who holds the corresponding private key can decrypt it
to obtain the client's identity. Later in message (3.15), the server's signature computed
over the client's identity is also protected with the session key K. Since a passive
attacker cannot complete Di±e-Hellman computation to derive K, he cannot obtain
any information about the client's identity. On the other hand, an active attacker has
no legitimate private key to decrypt the identity information in message (3.14), and he
cannot complete Di±e-Hellman exchange to derive K to decrypt message (3.15) either.
Therefore, both passive and active attacks cannot disclose the client's identity.
In the JFKi protocol, the client authenticates the server by verifying the server's
signature over its exponential in the second message, and hence the client is ensured
that the server's exponential is authentic. And then the client sends its identity protected
by the keys derived from Di±e-Hellman exchange. This method used in JFKi to achieve
identity con¯dentiality has two weaknesses. The ¯rst is that before a round trip occurs
the server needs more computation including the generation of the exponential and a
signature on its exponential. This makes the server more susceptible to computation-
DoS attacks. The second is that once the attacker knows the secret exponent y of the
server's exponential, the attacker can launch a replay attack to discover the client's
identity. Compared with JFKi, the server in our protocol needs less computation in
message (3.13), only including the generation of an exponential. For our protocol,
even when the server's secret exponent y is known to an attacker, the client's identity
con¯dentiality is still guaranteed as long as the server's private key is not exposed. In
our protocol, we use the server's private key to protect the client's identity because the
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server's private key is a long-term secret and more secure than the secret exponent y.
The server does not need to keep any state when sending out message (3.13), and
this avoids the threat of memory-DoS attacks. The nonce NS and the exponentials
gy generated by the server will be sent back in message (3.14), so there is no need
for the server to create state and store these information. Therefore, if the client is
fraudulent, the server will not have committed these storage resources, which provides
memory-DoS resistance. In order to avoid that the client may return forged nonce or
exponential, the server employs a secret hash key HK to compute an authenticator
HHK(gyjjNC jjNS jjMACC). The key HK is private to the server and is updated fre-
quently, and the authenticator sent back in message (3.14) can be used to ensure that
the nonces and the exponentials are the same as those in (3.13). On the other hand,
in message (3.13), the server's computation cost includes only a cryptographic hash
operation, the generation of a random nonce NS and an exponential gy. Just like the
password-based protocol we proposed earlier, the threat of DoS attacks is e®ectively
reduced by delaying the server's expensive computation to the last round. When the
server is under the computation-DoS attack and heavily burdened in computation, the
server can reuse previously used exponential gy. In this case, the server's computation
cost will only include the hash operation and the generation of the random nonce NS ,
and this enables the server to be resistant to computation-DoS attacks while sacri¯cing
some amount of forward secrecy.
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3.3.6 Implementation Issues and Performance Analysis
In implementation of our PKC-based protocol for wireless networks, the following is-
sues should be noticed and dealt with cautions. Like our password based protocol, our
PKC-based protocol has the same requirements on random number generation, secu-
rity associations rekeying, retransmission mechanism. Besides, it is required that the
private key HK of the authentication server be kept secret and updated frequently
to avoid compromise. The key is used as the hash key to compute an authenticator
(HHK(gxjjgyjjNC jjNS jjMACC)) which functions as a cookie. Its compromise will lead
to DoS attacks against the server. To o®er resistance to DoS attacks, the random expo-
nentials of the server could be pre-computed and reused if under heavy computational
burden. If the server's exponentials are reused due to heavy computational burden, per-
fect forward secrecy is no longer provided but the server is relieved from computation.
This trade-o® between forward security and resistance to DoS attacks can be di®erent
for di®erent applications, and it depends on requirements of di®erent applications.
Compared to our previously proposed password based protocol, our PKC-based pro-
tocol requires signature computation and needs more computation. However, it provides
features like nonrepudiation that the password-based one does not possess.
Likewise, the overhead of our PKC-based protocol also consists of two parts: the
authentication and key exchange overhead for each session and the packet processing
overhead for each packet. For each session, the computation cost of the client includes
the generation of an exponential, a Di±e-Hellman computation, a signature, a public key
encryption and a signature veri¯cation (other computation tasks are ignored since they
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need much less time). On the other hand, the server's computation cost includes the
generation of one exponential, a public key decryption, a Di±e-Hellman computation,
a signature veri¯cation, and a signature.
With regard to the second part of overhead, the delay of packet processing is the
same as that of the password based protocol discussed earlier. Here we also employ the
same benchmarks and system parameters as used in Section III. The overhead of our
PKC-based protocol is listed in table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Overhead of Our PKC Based Protocol
450MHz P III 2.1GHz P IV
Overhead/Session 88.6ms/7.7ms 1 29.2ms/7.7ms
Overhead/Packet 0.08ms/0.16ms 0.04ms/0.16ms
Total Overhead 2 (96:3+0:24¢n)ms (36:9+0:20¢n)ms
Total Overhead 3 4:2% 3:0%
1The data is in form of computation/transmission time.
2The total overhead for n-packet transmission.
3The total overhead of a 1000-packet session as a percentage of the total time.
As can be seen from the above table, our PKC-based protocol has an overhead of
4:2% and 3:0% of the total time for the two platforms, respectively. As a result, it can
be employed for access control in wireless networks without worsening the performance
dramatically.
3.4 Summary
Security issues are crucial for wireless communications, and a secure and e±cient access
control mechanism is the ¯rst line of defense for secure wireless networking. In this
Chapter we reviewed two two-layer access control architectures, the Lancaster architec-
ture [23,39] and the Stanford architecture [22]. We analyzed the access control protocols
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in the two architectures and identi¯ed various weaknesses and °aws.
Based on the same two-layer architectures, we proposed two access control protocols
to replace them respectively. The ¯rst one is based on a weak password shared between
a client and an authentication server, while the second one is based on public key cryp-
tosystems. Both of them can provide mutual authentication, secure key exchange and
perfect forward secrecy. Furthermore, the former provides protection against password




Group Key Agreement Protocol
for Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
4.1 Introduction
Wireless ad hoc networks continue to enjoy a tremendous rise in popularity because of
their convenience, °exibility and low deployment cost. As a form of group, security re-
quirements for group communications in ad hoc networks, including con¯dentiality, data
integrity, authentication and access control, have to be satis¯ed by group key manage-
ment schemes. Though extensive research has been done on group key management due
to the proliferation of group-oriented applications, existing solutions are not well-suited
for ad hoc networks because of the special properties of such networks.
In wireless ad hoc networks, ¯xed infrastructures are usually unavailable and each
node in the network can only communicate directly with other nodes within its power
range. Hence some nodes are required to relay packets on behalf of a source node in
order to deliver data to its destination. Moreover, nodes in ad hoc networks are usu-
ally resource-constrained in terms of power, bandwidth and computation capabilities.
The unique properties of ad hoc networks impose stringent requirements on group key
management schemes. The absence of infrastructure makes centralized group key man-
agement schemes inapplicable, while resource constraints on group members demand
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highly e±cient group key management schemes.
As stated in Chapter 2, group key management schemes can be classi¯ed into two
categories: group key distribution schemes and group key agreement schemes. Since
the entity responsible for key generation and distribution could likely become the single
point of failure as well as the performance bottleneck, group key distribution schemes are
not preferable in ad hoc group communications. Within group key agreement schemes,
centralized schemes use a centralized server for group key management and are ruled
out in ad hoc networks. Distributed group key agreement schemes do not require the
existence of a centralized server and are the subject of our study in this Chapter.
Some group key management schemes (e. g., [75, 76]) use a tree based approach
to manage keys as well as to reduce communication, computation and storage cost on
maintaining keying and rekeying materials. Wong et al. [71] performed an extensive
theoretical and experimental analysis on various types of key graphs and concluded that
the most e±cient key graph for group key management is a d-degree tree. However,
those key management schemes employing a key tree hierarchy are ine±cient if they do
not exploit the network topology to further reduce communication cost. In this case, two
nodes that are assigned to communicate heavy key management tra±c may have more
hops between them, while two nodes that are assigned to exchange less key management
tra±c may be close to each other. Moreover, multicast of key information is a frequent
operation in group key management schemes, but the multicast operation would be very
ine±cient if the key tree is constructed regardless of the network topology and location
of the group member nodes.
It has been noticed that designing a key tree structure which matches the network
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topology can signi¯cantly reduce communication cost, and this is important for wire-
less networks which is error-prone and bandwidth-limited. Such a key tree hierarchy
can localize the transmission of keying information and hence signi¯cantly reduces the
communication cost of rekeying. Some solutions have been proposed for group key distri-
bution in WLAN and ad hoc networks. However, these solutions are not well-suited for
group key agreement in ad hoc networks because keying messages transmission pattern
in group key agreement is di®erent from that in group key distribution.
To improve communication e±ciency in group key agreement schemes, we propose
an e±cient group key agreement scheme with a new key tree construction for ad hoc
networks. We present a tree-transformation algorithm which constructs an e±cient key
tree from the underlying multicast tree of the ad hoc network. The algorithm transforms
a multicast tree into a binary key tree which localizes keying information transmission
in group key agreement. Our group key agreement scheme based on this key tree largely
reduces the communication cost while keeping the computation cost at a very low level.
4.2 Our Group Key Agreement Scheme
In the dynamic groups such as ad hoc networks, membership is changing frequently. A
group key agreement protocol for such dynamic groups needs to support the membership
events as follows:
1. Join: a new member is added into the group
2. Leave: a member is removed from the group
3. Partition: the group is split into two or more subgroups
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4. Merge: two or more subgroups is united as a single group
The key tree construction schemes of group key distribution can not be employed di-
rectly in group key agreement because of di®erent message transmission pattern, while
existing group key agreement schemes ignore the network topology in their key tree
construction. Therefore, we attempt to construct the key tree which matches the net-
work topology. Stem from this point, we propose our communication-e±cient group key
agreement scheme for ad hoc networks. Our group key agreement scheme unites the
multicast tree and the key tree such that the network topology is closely related to the
key tree structure. We achieve this integration by converting the multicast tree into a
binary key tree. On our converted key tree, every subtree of the key tree corresponds to
a multicast subgroup of the multicast tree. Since the key tree is constructed such that
the subsequent multicast can be ¯nished e±ciently, our group key agreement scheme
achieves great e±ciency in communications. Moreover, our scheme has good computa-
tion e±ciency for group partition which occurs frequently in unstable networks.
Before proceeding to the next section, some notations used in this Chapter are listed
as follows:
n number of group members
Mi i-th group member; i 2 f1; :::; ng
hl; vi the v-th node at the l-th level on a key tree
p a large prime modulus
g exponentiation base
4.2.1 The Key Tree Hierarchy
The key tree used in the tree-based group key agreement schemes is a binary tree on
which each leaf represents a group member. Each interior node of the key tree has
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exactly two children, and it is not associated with any group member. Actually, these
interior nodes are logical and the whole key tree is called the logical key hierarchy. An
example of the key tree used in TGDH is illustrated in the Fig. 4.1. The nodes are
denoted hl; vi, where 0 6 v 6 2l ¡ 1 since each level l hosts at most 2l nodes (the root
is at the 0-th level). For convenience of presentation, the nodes are numbered as if they
were on a perfectly balanced tree. Each node hl; vi on the key tree is associated with a
key Khl;vi and a corresponding blinded key BKhl;vi = gKhl;vi mod p. The key Khl;vi of
Mi at the leaf node hl; vi is chosen randomly by Mi, while the key of an interior node is
derived from the keys of the interior node's two children by Di±e-Hellman computation.
Speci¯cally, the key of an interior node hl; vi is computed recursively as follows:
Khl;vi = gKhl+1;2viKhl+1;2v+1i mod p
= (BKhl+1;2vi)Khl+1;2v+1i mod p
= (BKhl+1;2v+1i)Khl+1;2vi mod p;
where node hl + 1; 2vi and node hl + 1; 2v + 1i are the two children of the node hl; vi.
Therefore, computing a key at hl; vi requires the knowledge of the key of one child
and the blinded key of the other child. The key Kh0;0i at the root node is the group key
known only to the group members.
To compute the group key, a member Mi needs to know a set of blinded keys, which
form a set called the co-path CPi. For example, the co-path of the member M2 in
Fig. 4.1 is CP2 = fh3; 0i; h2; 1i; h1; 1ig. With the blinded keys in the co-path CPi, the
member Mi can compute a series of keys from itself to the root of the key tree, and
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these keys form another set called key-path. For the same example, the member M2's


















Figure 4.1: An Example of the Key Kree in TGDH
With all the blinded keys of its co-path, a member Mi can compute all the keys
along the key-path, including the group secret Kh0;0i. For the example in Fig. 4.1, with
its own key Kh3;1i, M2 can compute Kh2;0i, Kh1;0i and Kh0;0i using BKh3;0i, BKh2;1i,
BKh1;1i, respectively.
In order for all group members to know the required blinded keys, multicast is
frequently used for key information transmission in tree-based group key agreement.
For instance, the blinded key BKh1;1i should be multicasted to M1, M2, M3 and M4,
while the blinded key BKh1;0i needs to be multicasted toM5,M6,M7 andM8. However,
during the construction of the key tree, the topology of the network is not taken into
consideration, hence the key tree can lead to ine±ciency in key information transmission.
4.2.2 The Multicast Tree Construction
A variety of tree-based multicast schemes [82{84] can be employed to achieve e±cient
multicast communication. In these multicast schemes, a multicast tree or a hierarchical
structure is employed to achieve communication e±ciency and scalability. In this phase,
any e±cient multicast tree construction scheme can be used for the group that wants to
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generate a group key. If the ad hoc network has implemented the multicast tree algo-
rithm for the purpose of multicast, our scheme can simply piggy-back on the multicast
tree algorithm of the underlying multicast scheme.
Since any multicast tree algorithm can be employed in our scheme, we only illustrate
our scheme with an example of a multicast tree based on the Steiner tree in [83]. The
multicast tree algorithm generates a Steiner tree in an incremental way, and an example
of the multicast tree based on the Steiner tree is illustrated in Fig. 4.2. The node M1
is the group initiator and the other nodes Mi(i = 2; :::; 8) are the rest members of the
multicast group. For multicast, the source nodeM1 multicasts the packets to its children
















Figure 4.2: An Example of the Multicast Tree
On the multicast tree in Fig. 4.2, each edge is always connecting two nearest nodes
in the ad hoc network, such as node M3 and M5 or M7 and M8. In other words, a node
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is always near to its direct children(if it has), and it is also near to its direct parent(if
it is not the root). While a node has a farther distance from its indirect children or
parents. For instance, the distance between node M1 and node M7 is larger than that
between node M1 and M4.
4.2.3 Conversion from the Multicast Tree to the Key Tree
Before the discussion of the conversion from the multicast tree to the key tree, we ¯rst
analyze the tra±c of the group key agreement.
We take the tree illustrated in Fig. 4.1 for example. We de¯ne the sponsor as the
rightmost node of a subtree on the key tree. For example, node M8 is the sponsor of the
whole key tree, the subtree rooted at the node h1; 1i and the subtree rooted at the node
h2; 3i, while M4 is the sponsor of the subtree rooted at the node h1; 0i. These sponsors
are responsible for multicasting blinded keys to the nodes that need them. For instance,
M8 should multicast BKh1;1i to M1;M2, M3 and M4, multicast BKh2;3i to M5 and M6.
As stated previously, each member Mi of the group needs to know the blinded keys
of its co-path CPi and its own session key. Consider the nodes on the subtree rooted at
h2; 0i in our example. M1 needs to know its co-path CP1=fBKh3;1i, BKh2;1i, BKh1;1ig;
M2 needs to know its co-path CP2=fBKh3;0i, BKh2;1i, BKh1;1ig and Kh3;1i; and M3
needs to know its co-path CP3=fBKh2;0i, BKh1;1ig and Kh2;1i. In other words, BKh1;1i
needs to be multicast to M1;M2;M3 and M4; BKh2;1i needs to be multicast to M1;M2;
BKh2;0i needs to be multicast to M3 and M4, so on and so forth.
Then the communication cost is listed in the following table:
It can be noticed that keying message transmission has a pattern of localization
88







since the keying messages are always useful to some nodes located on the same subtree.
For instance, BKh1;1i sent by M8 is only useful to M1;M2;M3;M4, which locate on the
subtree rooted at h1; 0i; BKh2;1i sent by M4 is only useful to M1;M2, which locate on
the subtree rooted at h2; 0i. To e±ciently deliver the information as listed in the above
table, M8 should be geographically close to nodes M1;M2;M3;M4, M4 should be close
to M1 or M2, and M1 should be close to M2, etc. After further consideration, it can be
seen that e±cient delivery requires M8 be close to M4, M4 be close to M2 and M2 be
close toM1. Therefore, it can be deduced that two sponsors of two subtrees whose roots
are siblings on the key tree should be geographically close to each other. For instance,
M4 and M8, M4 and M2, M6 and M8 should be close to each other in Fig 4.1. This
property of a key tree ensures a communication-e±cient group key agreement scheme.
Since the multicast tree represents the network topology, we convert the multicast
tree into the key tree to achieve our objective. We employ a conversion algorithm to
convert the multicast tree in Fig. 4.2 into an e±cient key tree.
The converted key tree has some desirable properties for e±cient multicast. Each
subtree of the multicast tree corresponds to a subtree on the converted key tree. More-


















































Figure 4.3: Conversion from the Multicast Tree to the Key Tree
sponding subtree on the key tree after conversion. For instance, the subtree rooted at
node M4 on the multicast tree is converted into the subtree rooted at node h1; 0i on the
key tree. Accordingly, the node M4, which is a root on a subtree of the multicast tree,
becomes the sponsor of the corresponding subtree on the key tree. Since all the nodes
on the same subtree of the multicast tree are in close vicinity, a sponsor of the subtree
can e±ciently multicast information to the nodes on this subtree. For example, M4, the
sponsor of the subtree rooted at node h1; 0i, is close to all the nodes (M6;M7;M8) on
this subtree and hence can e±ciently deliver multicast information to these nodes.
The second property of the converted key tree is that a sponsor is the parent of its
sub-sponsor on the corresponding mutlicast tree. On the key tree, we de¯ne a sponsor A
as a sub-sponsor of another sponsor B only if the root of A's corresponding subtree is a
child of the root of B's corresponding subtree. In our example, node M1 on the key tree
has the sub-sponsors M2;M3;M4, which are the children of M1 on the multicast tree.
This property ensures the e±cient transmission of the group key agreement messages.
For instance, the blinded key BKh1;1i should be transmitted fromM1 toM4;M6;M7;M8,
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so this can be accomplished by sending the blinded key from M1 to M4 and in turn
sending it from M4 to M6;M7;M8.
Another advantage of the key tree is that every pair of leaf nodes that share the
same parent take on a parent-child relationship on the multicast tree. Speci¯cally, on
the multicast tree, the right leaf node is the parent while the left node is the child. This
advantage enables the two nodes to accomplish the Di±e-Hellman exchange e±ciently
since they are neighbors on the multicast tree.
Our scheme has another advantage on merging and partitioning over other tree-based
Di±e-Hellman protocols. The group merge and partition occurs often in an unstable
network like ad hoc networks. In our scheme, the computation cost can be greatly
decreased because our key tree structure is based on the network topology as discussed
later.
After the key tree is constructed as speci¯ed above, the sponsors on the key tree
are responsible for multicasting required key information to each node. Then each node
computes the group key as discussed earlier. The process of group key computation is
the same as that of TGDH, and hence our protocol obtains the same security properties
as TGDH.
Key Tree Balance Optimization
In the process of group key agreement, the computation cost is determined by the key
tree height when the number of leaf nodes is ¯xed. Since our key tree is not constructed
as a balanced binary tree, its height could be much higher than that of TGDH's key
tree because the latter one is a balanced tree. As a result, our key tree construction can
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lead to more complex computation than TGDH. Therefore, we propose the following
optimization technique to reduce our key tree height and computation cost in group
key agreement. The balance improved key tree has approximately the same height as a
complete balanced tree in TGDH.
Suppose there are n nodes in the ad hoc network, and a multicast tree consisting
of these n nodes has been constructed. Then we ¯nd an edge e1 which can split the
multicast tree into two subtrees S1 and S2 so that j jS1j¡jS2j j is minimized. jSj denotes
the number of nodes within S. Then the nodes from S1 and S2 would be assigned on
the left and the right part of the key tree, respectively. For each subtree, similarly,
we then ¯nd another edge e2 which divides the subtree into two smaller subtrees with
approximately equal number of nodes. And the two smaller subtrees also corresponds
to two subtrees on the key tree. We continue the process until each subtree size is 1.
Finally each node's position on the key tree is determined from the described process.
An example of the optimization process is illustrated in Fig. 4.4.
This optimization process can largely reduce the key tree height, and the ¯nal tree
height could be only log(n) in some instances. The key tree height can not always be
reduced to the optimal in order to preserve the advantageous features of our key tree.
Basically, this is a trade-o® between communication cost and computation cost.
4.2.4 Join and Leave Operations
Consider the scenario that a new node Mn+1 wants to join a group fM1; :::;Mng. To
preserve the advantages of our scheme, the new node should be added to the key tree
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Figure 4.4: Key Tree Balance Optimization
the join does not increase the height of the key tree. This join approach would deprive
the advantages of our key tree and break its special structure. In order to keep the
advantages of our key tree structure, the new node is added into the key tree according
to its location in the network.
The new node Mn+1 starts the join process with a neighbor discovery procedure.
With the neighbor discovery procedure, Mn+1 recognizes its relative location in the
group. Based on this knowledge, Mn+1 identi¯es the insertion node on the key tree as
well as on the multicast tree. Then Mn+1 is inserted into the key tree and a sponsor
informs other nodes about Mn+1 joining. After the insertion, it seems as if the new key
tree after joining of Mn+1 is constructed directly from the n+ 1 nodes.
The join of Mn+1 will result in two di®erent scenarios according to the location of
Mn+1. In the ¯rst scenario, the node Mn+1 is located in the middle of two physically
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neighboring group nodes. As can be seen from the construction of the key tree, there is
a parent-child relationship between these two neighboring nodes on the multicast tree.
On the corresponding key tree, the child node is a sub-sponsor of the parent node. In
this case, the node Mn+1 becomes the child of the parent node and the parent of the
child node on the new multicast tree after its insertion. While on the corresponding
new key tree, Mn+1 becomes the sub-sponsor of the original sponsor and the original
sub-sponsor becomes Mn+1's sub-sponsor. As illustrated in Fig. 4.5, if the new node
M9 is located between M1 andM4, thenM9 is inserted into the multicast tree such that
M9 is the child of M1 and the parent of M4. While on the new key tree, M9 becomes
























Figure 4.5: Join Operations: Scenario 1
In the second scenario, Mn+1 is not located in the middle of any two neighboring
group nodes and the insertion would increase the number of branches of the closest
sponsor. The new node ¯nds the closest sponsor by neighbor discovery procedure, and
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then it is inserted into the subtree of the sponsor. The insertion position of the new
node is a trade-o® between computation and tree balance. As shown in Fig. 4.6, the




















Figure 4.6: Join Operations: Scenario 2
After the new node Mn+1 is inserted into the key tree, some key information needs
to be exchanged within the group so that every node can compute the new group key.
Since our new key tree still has the advantages of communication e±ciency, this process
can be accomplished e±ciently.
With regard to the leave process, the situation is a little more complex than the join
process. The most complicated scenario is the one when the root node of the mutlicast
tree (M1 in our example) leaves the group. In this case, the multicast tree is split into
several subtrees. Our approach requires the root of the ¯rst subtree(M2 in our example)
set up connections with other roots of the subtrees. Then a new multicast tree and the
corresponding key tree are constructed in the same way as illustrated in Fig. 4.7. In this
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Figure 4.7: Leave Operations
For the leave event that the leaving node is not the root of the multicast tree, the
leave process is much simpler. The leaving node is removed from the multicast tree,
and the parent of the leaving node becomes the parent of the children of the leaving
node. Then a new key tree can be obtained from the new multicast tree, and some
computation and communication are required to derive the new group key.
After the above join or leave operations, the key tree has been updated and the
group key has to be recomputed. The subsequent process is the same as the TGDH
protocol, and hence our scheme obtains the same security properties as TGDH.
4.2.5 Partition and Merge Operations
In an unstable network where network failure occurs now and then, the whole group
would be partitioned into several subgroups. Then after the network recovers from
failure some time later, these disconnected subgroups can be reunited as a larger group.
Since our key tree is constructed from the multicast tree which represents the network
topology, our scheme exhibits extraordinary advantages over other tree-based Di±e-
Hellman schemes.
When a network disconnection occurs in the network, the multicast tree is split
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into several parts and the corresponding key tree is also split into parts accordingly.
Some parts of the key tree are subtrees of the key tree, while others may be parts of
subtrees. Within each partitioned subtree of the key tree, the key of the root of the
subtree can be used as the group key within the corresponding group nodes. For those
parts that are not subtrees, some computation is still needed to derive the new group
key. The scenario that one link M1 to M4 is disconnected is illustrated in Fig 4.8. This
disconnection partitions the network into two parts, and the corresponding key tree is
split into two subtrees. As can be seen from this ¯gure, nodes from either parts do not
need any computation. The nodes on the subtree rooted at h1; 0i can use the key Kh1;0i






















Figure 4.8: Partition of Key Tree in Our Scheme
While if the key tree is not constructed as our key tree(e.g. the key trees of STR [76]
and TGDH [75]), the number of parts split by the disconnected links would be much more
than that of our scheme. Therefore, considerable computation e®orts are needed under
this situation. An extreme situation is shown in Fig 4.9 where the key tree is completely
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split by only one link failure. In this case, M1;M2;M3;M5 that can communicate each
other in a subgroup need to reconstruct a small key tree for them, and then compute










Figure 4.9: Partition of Key Tree in Other Schemes
Another scenario when the link fromM1 toM3 is broken is shown in Fig 4.10. In this
case, the key tree is split into two parts: the subtree rooted at h2; 2i and the remaining
part of the key tree. For nodes on the former part of the key tree, no computation
is needed at all. While each node on the latter part still needs one exponentiation to
generate a new group key. In this scenario, it is clear that our key tree requires less






















Figure 4.10: Another Partition Scenario
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The merge process is the reverse of the partition process. Similar to the leave process,
one of the roots of the subtrees on the multicast tree (i.e. the sponsors of the subtrees on
the key tree) is responsible for establishing connections with other roots when merging.




We measure the computation complexity by the number of exponentiations in the tree-
based group Di±e-Hellman key agreement schemes since exponentiation is the most
computationally intensive operation. We compare our scheme with TGDH to evaluate
the computation complexity of our scheme.
In the key tree construction phase, the computation complexity is close related to the
key tree structure. The more balanced the key tree is, the more e±cient in computation
the group key agreement scheme is. The key tree of TGDH is constructed as a balanced
binary tree, and the height of the key tree is minimized. While our key tree may be
imbalanced since it is constructed based on the network topology. So in the construction
phase, the computation cost of our scheme is more than that of TGDH, but this can be
compensated with e±ciency in communications of our scheme.
For the join event, the required computation cost is determined by the insertion
position and the height of the key tree. Once a new node is inserted on the key tree, the
keys on the key-path of the joining node need to be recomputed. On average, TGDH
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needs O(n) exponentiations in total for a join event. Since our key tree is not constructed
to maximize the key tree balance, our protocol requires more computation than TGDH
for node joining and leaving. Despite that, our simulation results presented later show
that the total delay of computation and keying message transmission is much less than
that of TGDH.
In our scheme, the computation cost is lowered as much as possible when the group
is split into several group because of network failure. A network fault, such as a link
failure, always partitions the network into several regions geographically. With our key
tree construction approach, the nodes belonging to the same geographical region locate
on the same subtree. Therefore, the keys of the roots of the subtrees still can be used
instead of recomputing after partition, and computation cost is reduced dramatically.
As illustrated in Fig. 4.8, even no computation is required under some circumstance,
while TGDH needs much more computation in the same scenario as shown in Fig. 4.9.
When the network recovers from network fault, several groups need to be merged
into a single group. Our scheme can reunite these groups into a larger group with the
least computational e®ort while still enjoying all the advantages stated previously.
4.3.2 Communication Complexity
E±ciency in communication is the main advantage of our scheme and our main design
objective. Since we have illustrated the advantage of our scheme for partition and merge,
now we only discuss our scheme in the case of key tree construction, join and leave.
During the key tree construction phase, our key tree implements e±cient delivery
of keying messages. On the key tree, a sponsor of any group can always e±ciently
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multicast keying messages to all the group members. As shown in Fig. 4.3, the nodes on
the subtree rooted at the node h1; 0i have a common node h1; 1i in their co-paths. So the
blinded key BKh1;1i of the node h1; 1i should be multicast to these nodes(M4;M6;M7
and M8). The blinded key BKh1;1i is ¯rst unicast to M4 by M1, and is subsequently
multicast to M6;M7 by M4. M7 then further unicast the blinded key to M8. Moreover,
the nodes M4 and M6, as well as the nodes M7 and M8, are close such that the keying
message exchange between them is e±cient.
If the key tree of TGDH is constructed as the one in Fig. 4.9, the communication
cost would be signi¯cantly more than that of our scheme. In this case the nodes on
the subtree rooted at h1; 0i are M3;M7;M5 and M8. Furthermore, M3 and M7 need to
exchange blinded keys between them, and so it is with M5 and M8. However, the nodes
M3;M5 are far from M7;M8, which makes the information transmission very ine±cient.
We use the amount of keying messages transmission (unicast or multicast) during
the protocol execution as the metric for communication performance evaluation. The
amount of keying message transmission is determined by both the number of keys trans-
mitted and the hops these keys traverse. Since all the key have the same size, we de¯ne
one key being transmitted over one hop as 1 unit of communication cost. For a group






where MCost2i is the cost of keying message multicast. The multicast cost MCost2i is
proportional to the multicast size (2i)k [91], where k is a multicast cost parameter with
101
0 < k < 1.














2L(1¡k) ¡ 1 ¢ 2
k ¢ (2L ¡ 1)
For multicast cost parameter k = 0:5 and L = 8, the cost of TGDH Cost0C is about
10 times of that of our scheme.
The join and leave events are managed e±ciently under our scheme. Take Fig. 4.5
as an example. After the new node M9 is inserted into the key tree, M9's blinded key
BKh2;1i needs to be multicast to the nodes on the subtree rooted at h2; 0i. Then Kh1;0i
and BKh1;0i are recomputed, and BKh1;0i needs to be multicast to the nodes on the
subtree rooted at h1; 1i. All these can be accomplished e±ciently in the same way as
in the key tree construction phase discussed above. Furthermore, after the insertion of
the new node, the new key tree still obtains all the advantages as before. The leave
operations can also be completed in an e±cient way accordingly.
For a group of size n = 2L, we can also calculate our scheme's communication cost
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where arg is a ¯xed coe±cient and k is the cost parameter of multicast. So it is clear
that TGDH's communication cost for joining and leaving is much more than that of our
scheme. CostJ jL : Cost0J jL = 1 : (L¡ 1) if k = 1, which means TGDH requires 5 times
communication cost as our scheme if n = 64.
4.4 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our protocol, we have implemented our group key agree-
ment protocol and the TGDH protocol on ns-2 for comparison. Our implementation
is based on the MAODV protocol [85], which is a tree-based multicast protocol using
AODV routing protocol [63] for ad hoc networks. Our group key agreement protocol
uses the multicast tree of MAODV to construct the key tree.
We evaluate the performance of our group key agreement protocol in terms of group
key agreement delay, communications cost and messages loss. The group key agreement
delay measures the latency of each node to compute the group key after a node joins
or leaves the group. We measure the delay as the period from the time a node requires
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to join the group to the time a group member ¯nishes the group key computation.
The delay comprises of the time on group key computation and the communications
latency. In our simulations, we assume that each node has the computation power of
a 450MHz Pentium III processor, and a 1024-bit modular exponentiation cost 10ms for
each node [86].
We simulate our protocol and the TGDH protocol on ad hoc networks with di®erent
network size ranging from 30 nodes to 100 nodes. The network size is the number of the
nodes in the network, and it determines the maximum group size (when all the nodes
join the group). When not all the network nodes join the group, the non-member nodes
may need to relay packets for the group members to exchange key information. For each
network size, we simulate both protocols on 20 di®erent network scenarios. Then we
analyze the join delay and the leave delay for di®erent group sizes and di®erent network
sizes. The network size, connectivity and area of the network scenarios are listed in the
following table.
Table 4.1: Connectivity of the Network Scenarios
Network Size Average hops Maximum hops Simulation Area
between two nodes between two nodes
30 3.557 12 1000mx1000m
50 3.227 9 1000mx1000m
80 5.547 18 1500mx1500m
100 4.819 15 1500mx1500m
For each experiment, we let the nodes join the group gradually until all the nodes
join the group, and then let the nodes leave the group one by one until no one is in the
group. Then we obtain the communication and group key agreement delay for the join
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and leave events.
























(a) Amount of Tra±c





















(b) No. of Messages Sent























(c) No. of Messages Forwarded























(d) No. of Messages Dropped
Figure 4.11: Tra±c Comparison Between TGDH and Our Protocol
Figure 4.11 shows the tra±c comparison between TGDH and our protocol for dif-
ferent group sizes. Figure 4.11(a) illustrates the averaged total amount of tra±c trans-
mitted in the network on all the experiments for di®erent network sizes, while ¯gure
4.11(b), 4.11(c) and 4.11(d) show the averaged total messages sent, number of messages
forwarded and number of messages dropped on all experiments, respectively. For the
same network size, our protocol outperforms TGDH greatly on all the issues. Our pro-
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tocol introduces a communication cost as much as 1=10 of TGDH as shown in the ¯gure.
And proportionally fewer messages and less messages are forwarded or dropped in the
network with our protocol.

























(a) Join for Network Size = 30


























(b) Join for Network Size = 50


























(c) Join for Network Size = 80



























(d) Join for Network Size = 100
Figure 4.12: Join Delay for Di®erent Network Sizes
Fig. 4.12 shows the group key agreement delay when a node joins the group for
di®erent networks sizes. As can be seen from the ¯gures, the delay of our protocol is
almost always less than that of the TGDH protocol. And as the group size increases, the
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delay incurred by the TGDH protocol increases dramatically, while our protocol only
causes a slowly increasing delay.
























(a) Leave for Network Size = 30


























(b) Leave for Network Size = 50






























(c) Leave for Network Size = 80



























(d) Leave for Network Size = 100
Figure 4.13: Leave Delay for Di®erent Network Sizes
Similar to the join events, in Fig. 4.13 our protocol exhibits its e±ciency over the
TGDH protocol in the delay of leave events in group key agreement. For a small group
size, our protocol and TGDH have similar delay for leave events. While as the group
size becomes larger, the delay of TGDH increases very fast but our protocol only causes
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moderate increase in delay for group members.
In our group key agreement protocol, we only consider the static network topology
of ad hoc networks, and do not explicitly take the impact of mobility into consideration.
Also the performance impact of mobility is not evaluated. However, we can expect a
slightly dropdown on performance for small mobility and moderate mobility, since our
group key agreement scheme is still e±cient in message delivery.
4.5 Summary
In this Chapter, we presented a group key agreement scheme employing a novel key tree
construction. The main contributions of our scheme can be summarized as follows:
² Our scheme constructs the key tree piggybacking on the multicast tree from the
underlying multicast scheme. With this specially constructed key tree, the group
key agreement can be accomplished with great e±ciency.
² The e±ciency in communications is greatly improved with our key tree. Con-
structed from the corresponding multicast tree, our key tree greatly facilitates
transmission of key information within the group. As a result of communication
e±ciency, the throughput of the network is improved while the power consump-
tion, delay, and the packet loss ratio are decreased greatly, which are important
in ad hoc networks.
² It demonstrates striking advantage over other key trees regarding membership
events. The process of our key tree construction embodies the network topology
and this property reduces computation and communication e®orts dramatically
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for our key tree in join, leave, partition and merge operations.
² We implement our protocol on ns-2 and present the simulation result for the
performance of our protocol. The result shows that our protocol has a much less
delay compared with TGDH, and as the network size and the group size increase,
the delay of our protocol increases very slowly while the delay of the TGDH
protocol increases dramatically.
Furthermore, our key tree construction approach can be used to replace other key trees








Mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) still have not changed our way of using wireless
networks. The ad hoc mode of 802.11 networks is seldom switched on by normal users,
but is almost only used in laboratory testbeds. The reason that ad hoc networks have
not been massively deployed is because current research and development of MANET
are focusing on specialized applications (military applications, disaster recovery etc.).
To make MANET a more commercialized commodity, wireless mesh networks(WMN), a
new type of wireless networks emerges as an infrastructured multi-hop wireless network.
Mesh networks provide a °exible and low-cost extension of wired infrastructure networks
with ad hoc network technology, and hence they have advantages of both ad hoc networks
and wireless LAN.
Except that mesh networks are connected to wired networks, mesh networks are
almost the same as MANET and inherit many features of MANET. Mesh networks are
multihop networks with dynamic network topology. Each node is still required to serve
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as both a router and a normal mobile node, and users can dynamically join or leave the
network. Wireless mesh networks have the following characteristics:
² WMN supports ad hoc networking, and is capable of self-organization. The net-
work topology of WMN is dynamic and each node in WMN is still required to
serve as both a router and a normal mobile node. Therefore, many research result
can be applied on WMN as well.
² WMN is multi-hop wireless networks with a wireless infrastructure or backbone.
Hence Internet access or trusted servers are possibly provided in WMN.
Although mesh networks are still new compared to MANETs, they have shown their
strong potential in commercial applications. Community networks are a type of mesh
networks that provide Internet access to a community of users that share the same
Internet access link, and they can be used for neighborhood surveillance and emergency
management. Mesh networks are also the ideal solution for intelligent transportation
systems to alleviate transportation congestion and improve safety and security. Such a
system has been implemented by Meshnetworks Inc. and the system has been deployed
by public transportation companies.
Due to the proliferation of group-oriented applications, e.g. teleconferencing, collab-
orative workspaces, there is a rising demand for secure group key agreement in wireless
mesh networks. As human-memorable passwords are extensively used for user authen-
tication and key exchange in applications like internet banking, remote user access etc.,
a password-only group key agreement is preferable in wireless mesh networks.
The problem of authentication and key exchange between two parties sharing a
password, referred to as the two-party password-authenticated key exchange (2PAKE)
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problem, has been well studied and many solutions have been proposed in the literature.
While the group PAKE protocol has not received enough research e®orts.
In group oriented communications, either the group shares a single password, or each
client in the group shares an independent password with a trusted server. The single-
password setting is not preferable in real applications for several reasons. First, if a client
in the group leaves or the password of a client is compromised, the shared password has
to be updated, which could be a very expensive process. Moreover, compromise of any
client leads to breakdown of the entire system. Secondly, individual client identi¯cation
is impossible in this setting. As a result, no one is able to distinguish one client from
another, and it is impossible for a subgroup of the group to securely establish a session
key and have secure communications. It is easy to see that the independent-password
setting avoids the above problems and re°ects more accurately what is happening in the
real world.
Group PAKE protocols in the independent-password setting need more careful treat-
ment since they su®er from attacks which are not present in the single password setting,
such as attacks initiated by legitimate clients against other clients' passwords. Not only
should passwords be resistant to outsider attacks, but they should be secure against
insider attacks.
In this Chapter, we propose an e±cient group PAKE protocol, referred to as nPAKE+
protocol, well-suited for wireless mesh networks under the independent-password set-
ting. By employing a Di±e-Hellman key tree in group key establishment, the protocol
achieves group key establishment with only 4 message °ows, and every client needs only
to perform 5 + dlogne exponentiations. In our protocol, we do not explicitly taken into
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account the impact of mobility, and its impact on performance is not evaluated.
5.2 Our nPAKE+ Protocol for Multi-hop Wireless Net-
works
In this section, we present a group PAKE protocol, called nPAKE+ protocol, under the
independent-password setting for multi-hop wireless mesh networks.
Group key agreement problem using only passwords for wireless mesh networks is
described as follows. As depicted in Fig. 5.1, clients in a typical wireless mesh network
want to hold a secure group conference with the help of a trusted third server (not shown
in the ¯gure) located in Internet, and all they can use for group key agreement is a weak






Figure 5.1: A Typical Topology of Mesh Networks
Our group PAKE protocol under the independent-password setting is well-suited
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for wireless mesh networks for the following reasons. Infrastructure like trusted servers
is available in mesh networks, and this meets the requirement for a trusted server of
our protocol. Hop-by-hop message transmission style of our protocol matches multi-hop
feature of wireless mesh networks perfectly. Our protocol also provides great e±ciency in
communications and computation, which is desired in bandwidth-limited wireless mesh
networks.
5.2.1 System Setup and Requirements
In the system set-up of our nPAKE+, n clients C1; C2; :::; Cn share n independent pass-
words p1; p2; :::; pn with a trusted server S respectively. They agree on two large primes
p and q with p = 2q+1, a subgroup Gp;q of Z¤p , a generator g of Gp;q and a cryptographic
secure keyed hash function HK(¢). Notations used in the description of the protocol are
given in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Notations for Group PAKE Protocol
Ci The i-th client, i = 1; 2; :::; n
S The trusted server
pi The password shared between Ci and S
p; q Two large primes with p = 2q + 1
Gp;q; g The subgroup of order q in Z¤p and its generator, respectively
HK(¢) A keyed cryptographically secure hash function using a key K
Ki; BKi
1 The secret key and blinded key for client Ci; i = 1; 2; :::; n
hl; vi The vth node at the lth level on the binary key tree, refer to Fig. 5.2
Khl;vi; BKhl;vi The secret key and blinded key for node hl; vi
SKi;i+1 The session key shared between Ci and Ci+1; i = 1; 2; :::; n¡ 1
1They are interchangeable with Khl;vi; BKhl;vi if Ci is located at hl; vi on the key tree.
A group PAKE protocol should meet the following security requirements:
² Mutual Authentication: Each client should have mutual authentication with the
server to thwart attacks like masquerade attacks.
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² Password Secrecy: Passwords should be protected from o®-line dictionary attacks,
and online password guessing attacks should be detected.
² Group Key Secrecy: The established group key is only shared among group mem-
bers, not known by any entity outside the group.
² Perfect Forward Secrecy: Compromise of the long-term secret passwords does not
lead to disclosure of previous group keys.
5.2.2 The Di±e-Hellman Key Tree
Key graphs are extensively used in (non-password based) group key agreement protocols
to achieve great e±ciency in computation and communications. Wong et al. [70] and
Wallner et al. [73] are the ¯rst to introduce the concept of a key graph, called the Logical
Key Hierarchy(LKH), to improve e±ciency in group key management. The One-way
Function Tree(OFT) proposed by McGrew and Sherman [69] improves the hierarchical
tree approach further. In the OFT, the key of the parent is derived from the keys of
its children, and hence it reduces the size of the rekeying messages to half of the LKH.
Based on the key tree, some group key agreement proposals [74, 76, 102, 117, 120, 121]
used the Di±e-Hellman exchange technique in group key establishment.
The Di±e-Hellman key tree used in our protocol has the same structure as that
discussed in Section 4.2.1, with minor di®erences. It is also a binary tree on which each
leaf represents a group member. Every interior node of the key tree has exactly two
leaves, and is not associated with any group member. An example of the key tree used
in our protocol is illustrated in Fig. 5.2. The same notations used in Section 4.2.1 are
used here. The nodes are denoted hl; vi, where 0 6 v 6 2l ¡ 1 since each level l hosts at
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most 2l nodes (the root is at the 0-th level). For any interior node hl; vi; its left child
and right child are denoted hl + 1; 2vi and hl + 1; 2v + 1i respectively. Each node hl; vi
on the key tree is associated with a secret key Khl;vi and a corresponding blinded key
BKhl;vi computed as gKhl;vi mod p.
The only di®erence in this key tree structure is the secret key at the leaf node. The
secret key Khl;vi at a leaf node hl; vi, which is associated with a client Ci, is constructed
between the client Ci and the server S in our protocol. While the secret key of an
interior node is derived from the keys of the interior node's two children by Di±e-
Hellman computation. The corresponding blinded key is then computed following the
formula BKhl;vi = gKhl;vi mod p. Speci¯cally, the secret key and the blinded key of an
interior node hl; vi are computed recursively as follows:
Khl;vi = gKhl+1;2viKhl+1;2v+1i mod p
= (BKhl+1;2vi)Khl+1;2v+1i mod p
= (BKhl+1;2v+1i)Khl+1;2vi mod p;
BKhl;vi = gKhl;vi mod p:
Note that if a client Ci is located at a leaf node hl; vi on the key tree, then its secret
key and blinded key Khl;vi; BKhl;vi are also denoted as Ki and BKi respectively. These
two types of denotations (see Fig. 5.2) are interchangeable for a client Ci at a leaf node
hl; vi.
Therefore, computing a secret key at hl; vi requires the knowledge of the key of one
child and the blinded key of the other child. The secret key Kh0;0i at the root node is
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the group key which should be known only to the group members.
In order to compute the group key, a member Ci needs to know a set of blinded
keys, which form a set called the co-path. With the blinded keys in the co-path, the
member Ci can compute a set of keys from itself to the root of the key tree, and these
keys form another set called key-path. For a client Ci located at a leaf node hl; vi, we
denote its key-path as KPi or KPhl;vi, its co-path as CPi or CPhl;vi. On the key tree,
the key path KPi is a path from Ci itself until the root node (h0; 0i) of the key tree.
While the co-path CPi is formed by all the nodes that are directly connected with the
key-path KPi on the key tree. And the key-path KPi splits the co-path CPi into two
halves: Ri on the right side and Li on the left side.
For example, in Fig. 5.2 the client C2's key-path is KP2 = KPh3;1i = fKh3;1i, Kh2;0i,
Kh1;0i;Kh0;0ig, and its co-path is CP2 = CPh3;1i = fBKh3;0i; BKh2;1i; BKh1;1ig. The
key-path KP2 is a path from C2 (or h3; 1i) until the root of the key tree. And each node
from the co-path CP2 is directly connected with the key-path KP2 on the key tree. The
co-path CP2 is split into two halves by the key-path KP2: R2 = fBKh2;1i; BKh1;1ig,
and L2 = fBKh3;0ig.
The following two properties of the key tree are important for group key agreement
in our protocol:
² For any binary Di±e-Hellman key tree with n leaves labelled from C1 to Cn, client
Ci can compute Li+1 using Li, Ki, and fBKj : 1 · j · ng. Similarly, Ci can
compute Ri¡1 using Ri, Ki, and fBKj : 1 · j · ng.
² For any binary Di±e-Hellman key tree with n leaves labelled from C1 to Cn, client
Ci can compute the group key using Li, Ri, and Ki.
117
The second property is clear from the de¯nition of the co-path since the co-path
CPi = Li [ Ri is de¯ned as the set of blinded keys from which the group key can be
computed by client Ci. For the ¯rst property of the key tree, we decribe how Ci can
compute Ri¡1 using Ri, Ki, and fBKj : 1 · j · ng. Suppose client Ci and Ci¡1 locate
at node vi and vi¡1 on the key tree, respectively. Let u be the nearest common ancestor
of vi and vi¡1, and ul and ur are u's left and right child respectively. Then it is clear
that Ri¡1 µ Ri[BKvr where BKvr denotes the blinded key at node vr. For the subtree
that has vr as the root, vi is the leftmost node of the subtree. Hence client Ci can











































































































Figure 5.2: An Example of the Key Tree
With all the blinded keys of its co-path, a client Ci can compute all the keys along
the key-path, including the group secret Kh0;0i. For the example in Fig. 5.2, with its own
key Kh3;1i, C2 can compute Kh2;0i, Kh1;0i and Kh0;0i using BKh3;0i, BKh2;1i, BKh1;1i,
respectively.
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5.2.3 Description of the Protocol
After introducing the Di±e-Hellman key tree, we describe our nPAKE+ protocol in
this section. Our protocol achieves group key establishment and authentication with 3
message °ows. The ¯rst °ow starts from the client C1, traverses through C2; C3; :::; Cn,
and ¯nally reaches the server S. After that, the second °ow initiated by the server in
the reverse direction from S until C1. After the second °ow terminates at C1, C1 starts
the third °ow towards Cn, and the third °ow stops at S.
² Flow 1: Client C1 chooses r1 2R Zq and initiates the ¯rst °ow by sending a
request comprising of the identities fCigni=1 of all clients to join the group and
an exponential (gr1)p1 encrypted with its password. The request traverses all the
clients (from C1 to Cn) until it reaches the server. Upon receiving the request,
each client Ci selects ri 2R Zq and adds his own encrypted exponential (gri)pi into
the request. So when the request ¯nally reaches the server S, the request consists
of n identities and n encrypted exponentials contributed by the n clients.
Ci ¡! Ci+1 : fCjgnj=1jf(grj )pjgij=1; i = 1; 2; :::; n¡ 1;
Cn ¡! S : fCjgnj=1jf(grj )pjgnj=1:
(5.1)
² Flow 2: The second °ow of messages runs in the reverse direction, from the server
S to C1. After receiving the request, the server parses fCigni=1jf(gri)pigni=1 ,
and uses corresponding passwords to decrypt (gri)pi to obtain g
ri(i = 1; 2; :::; n).
Then for each client Ci(i = 1; 2; :::; n), S chooses si 2R Zq and computes a session
key Ki = (gri)
si . Then the server computes ¼ = BK1jC1j ¢ ¢ ¢ jBKnjCn and ¿i =
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HKi(¼), and sends ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgnj=1 to Cn.
The reply originated from the server S passes through Cn to C1. Receiving
the reply, Ci parses it as ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgij=1jRij»i;i+1. By default, Rnj»n;n+1 =
nil. Ci decrypts (gsi)pi to obtain g
si using his password. Then he computes the
session key Ki = (gsi)
ri and the blinded BKi = gKi , and veri¯es whether the
computed BKi equals to BKi in ¼. Then Ci veri¯es the validity of ¼ by checking
HKi(¼)
?= ¿i. In the case where i 6= n, Ci also computes SKi;i+1 = (BKi+1)Ki
and veri¯es Ri by checking whether HSKi;i+1(Rij0) equals »i;i+1.
If the reply passes all veri¯cations, Ci(i = 2; 3; :::; n) prepares an outgoing
message for the next client Ci¡1. Ci computes Ri¡1 with Ri, Ki and ¼, and
computes SKi¡1;i = (BKi¡1)Ki . Then he computes »i¡1;i = HSKi¡1;i(Ri¡1j0) and
sends ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgi¡1j=1jRi¡1j»i¡1;i to Ci¡1.
S ¡! Cn : ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgnj=1;
Ci ¡! Ci¡1 : ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgi¡1j=1jRi¡1j»i¡1;i; i = n; :::; 2:
(5.2)
where ¼ = BK1jC1j ¢ ¢ ¢ jBKnjCn.
² Flow 3: When the reply in Flow 2 ¯nally reaches C1, C1 does the veri¯cations
as speci¯ed in Flow 2. If veri¯cations are successful, then C1 computes the group
key with R1 and K1 as well as ¼. Then C1 computes L2, ¾1;2 = HSK1;2(L2j1),
´1 = HK1(C1jC2j ¢ ¢ ¢ jCn), and starts the last °ow by sending out L2j¾1;2j´1 to C2.
Then each client Ci(i = 2; 3; :::; n) receives the message Lij¾i¡1;ijf´jgi¡1j=1, and
he veri¯es Li by checking ¾i¡1;i
?= HSKi¡1;i(Lij1). If the veri¯cation is suc-
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cessful, he computes the group key with Ki, Li; Ri and ¼. If i 6= n, Ci com-
putes ¾i;i+1 = HSKi;i+1(Li+1j1), computes Li+1 from Li;Ki and ¼, computes
´i = HKi(C1jC2j ¢ ¢ ¢ jCn), and sends the outgoing message Li+1j¾i;i+1jf´jgij=1 to
Ci+1. Otherwise, Cn computes ´n and sends f´jgnj=1 to the server S.
Ci ¡! Ci+1 : Li+1j¾i;i+1jf´jgij=1; i = 1; :::; n¡ 1:
Cn ¡! S : f´jgnj=1
(5.3)
After the third °ow ¯nally reaches the server, the server veri¯es each ´i from
client Ci to authenticate each client. If any veri¯cation is failed, then the server
can identify which client(s) is(are) invalid and not authenticated. This measure
is intended to thwart on-line password guessing attacks.
After the last °ow reaches the server, each client has already computed his own
Li and Ri, so each client obtain his own co-path CPi = Li [ Ri. Therefore, every
client can independently calculate the same group key Kh0;0i and use it for secure group
communications.
5.3 Security and Performance Analysis
In this section, we provide an informal analysis of security for our protocol, and evaluate
the performance of our protocol afterwards. We are going to show the property of group
key secrecy, clients' password secrecy, and perfect forward secrecy of our protocol. In










































Figure 5.3: An Example of the Protocol with 5 Nodes
Mutual Authentication. Mutual authentication between each client and the server
is required to thwart possible attacks like masquerade attacks. Under the independent-
password setting, only the server knows the password for each client and it is the server's
responsibility to authenticate legitimate clients. At the same time, each client needs to
authenticate the server to ensure the server is not cheating on him.
In the second °ow of our protocol, the server computes the session key Ki with each
client Ci, and sends ¼ = BK1jC1j ¢ ¢ ¢ jBKnjCn and ¿i = HKi(¼) back to clients. So each
client is able to authenticate the server by checking HKi(¼)
?= ¿i. This veri¯cation also
ensures BKi is not modi¯ed by any client.
While in the third °ow of our protocol, each client also computes the session key Ki
and sends the server ´i = HKi(C1jC2j ¢ ¢ ¢ jCn). The server then can authenticate each
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client by verifying HKi(C1jC2j ¢ ¢ ¢ jCn) ?= ´i.
Group Key Secrecy. In our protocol, the server is authenticated to each client and
each client is also authenticated to the server independently. Therefore, only legitimate
parties can ¯nish the protocol and derive the correct group key.
After the server receives the ¯rst °ow of messages, it establishes n session keys
Ki(1 · i · n) with n clients respectively. Then the server sends back the reply (see Flow
2) ¼jf(gsj )pj j¿jgnj=1 to Cn. Upon receiving the reply, a client Ci decrypts (gsi j¿i)pi
and computes Ki and BKi. The client authenticates the server by checking whether the
computed BKi equals the one in ¼. Only if the server is authentic can it be authenticated
by the clients. If the authentication is successful, the client checks whether other blinded
keys in ¼ are valid by verifying ¿i
?= HKi(¼). If the message passes the veri¯cation, the
client Ci(i = n ¡ 1; n ¡ 2; :::; 1) can authenticate Ci+1 and Ri by checking whether
HSKi;i+1(Rij0) ?= »i;i+1. In the third °ow of the protocol, client Ci(i = 2; 3; :::; n)
authenticates client Ci¡1 and Li by checking ¾i¡1;i
?= HSKi¡1;i(Lij1). Whereafter each
client Ci can compute the group key Kh0;0i using Ri; Li and his own session key Ki.
When the third °ow reaches the server, the server authenticates each client by checking
´i
?= HKi(C1jC2j ¢ ¢ ¢ jCn). Therefore, each client are mutually authenticated with the
server, and a secret key Ki is established between client Ci and the server. The group
key Kh0;0i is constructed in a contributory way from the authenticated shares of all valid
clients, so it can only be correctly derived by valid group members.
Password Secrecy. For a passive outside attacker who eavesdrops the communi-
cations between the clients and the server, it is computationally infeasible for him to
discover clients' passwords or the secret group key. If the adversary attempts to launch
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a dictionary attack to client Ci's password , he ¯rst guesses a password p0i, uses p
0
i to
decrypt (gri)pi and (g
si)pi to obtain g
r0i and gs
0





to verify whether his guess is correct, which is infeasible assuming the hardness of the
Di±e-Hellman problem. If the adversary's objective is to ¯nd the secret group key, he
needs to know at least one client's session key Ki to recover the group key. Since he
even cannot compromise the passwords to obtain gri and gsi , he is unable to derive the
correct Ki = grisi . As a result, the adversary has no way to discover the secret group
key.
An active outside attacker impersonating a client or the server would not be au-
thenticated successfully by the server or other clients, and it would be detected. Not
having the correct password, the attacker cannot compute the correct Ki and authen-
ticate itself to the server. Furthermore, to be authenticated successfully by another
client, client Ci must be able to compute session keys SKi¡1;i(i = 2; 3; :::; n) and
SKi;i+1(i = 1; 2; :::; n ¡ 1). As discussed earlier, the attacker is unable to obtain the
correct Ki, and hence he cannot derive the correct session keys SKi¡1;i and SKi;i+1.
An outside adversary may also impersonate as a group of clients to trick the server
to run the protocol with them. In this case, the adversary can impersonate n clients
and guest one password for each client in a single protocol run. This on-line password-
guessing attack is a serious threat for the protocol, and it is important for the server
to detect the attack to thwart such attacks. In the third °ow of our protocol, a client
Ci needs to compute ´i to authenticate himself to the server. If he fails to authenticate
himself to the server, then the server will detect the attack and continuous failure will
alert the server.
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It is possible that one client is interested in other clients' passwords. We further
claim that in our protocol no client is able to discover other clients' passwords. A
malicious client can only decrypt the exponential encrypted with his own password, but
not those exponentials encrypted with other clients' passwords. For any valid client
in the protocol, As a result, the malicious client does not have any advantage over an
outside attacker. As analyzed before, it is computationally infeasible for a malicious
client to disclose other clients' passwords by launching any attacks including dictionary
attacks.
Perfect Forward Secrecy. Since the group key is contributorily constructed by
all the clients and the server using Di±e-Hellman exchange, past group keys are secure
against compromise of the long-term secret passwords, and hence perfect forward secrecy
is achieved in our protocol.
Performance. Under the independent password setting, our protocol is both °ex-
ible and e±cient in communications and computation. First, under the independent
password setting, our protocol accommodates formations of secure subgroups. Any
subgroup of the whole group can run the protocol to establish a group key for the sub-
group. Secondly, the protocol employs key tree in group key construction to provide
communication and computation e±ciency. This greatly reduces communication and
computation costs. The protocol needs only three message °ows to establish the group
key, and each client needs only 5 + dlog ne exponentiations while the server needs 3n
exponentiations. A comparison on computation e±ciency between the protocol under
the single password setting by Bresson et al. [101], the protocol EKE-U by Byun and
Lee [95] and our protocol is given in Table 5.2. Bresson's protocol requires (n + 5)=2
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exponentiations for each client on average, EKE-U protocol requires (n + 3)=2 expo-
nentiations for each client, while our protocol requires only 5 + dlog ne for each client
at most. Though our protocol requires the server to complete 3n exponentiations addi-
tionally, the total number of exponentiations required in our protocol (n(8+ dlog ne)) is
still much lower than that required in Bresson's protocol and EKE-U protocol.
Furthermore, each client shares a password with the server instead of sharing pairwise
secrets with all other clients, hence the protocol scales to large group size.
Table 5.2: Computation and Communication Cost Comparison between Group
Password-based Protocols
Client (Avg.) Server Total No. of Msgs
Bresson's Protocol (n+ 5)=2 - n(n+ 5)=2 3n(n2=2)1
EKE-U Protocol (n+ 3)=2 (n+ 1)(n+ 2)=2 n2 + 3n 4n(3n2=2)
Our Protocol 5 + dlog ne 3n n(8 + dlog ne) 3n(n2)
1Numbers in brackets give total message size by taking the exponential size as a unit.
5.4 Summary
In this Chapter, we proposed a server-assisted group password-authenticated key ex-
change protocol where each client shares an independent password with a trusted server.
Under this independent-password setting, our protocol provides better °exibility than
those protocols under the single-password setting. Moreover, the protocol employs a
Di±e-Hellman key tree for group key agreement, and hence achieves great e±ciency in
both computation and communications. Finally, we provided a detailed security and
performance analysis for the proposed protocol. Our future work is to give a formal
security proof for the protocol.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Future Research
Conclusions
Popularity and extensive applications of wireless communications bring many bene-
¯ts like convenience, °exibility for users. Due to the unique characteristics of wireless
networks, such networks also bring new challenges in security issues as well as known se-
curity risks in wired networks. In wireless networks, open transmission medium, limited
power, restricted computation capability and network bandwidth make it very di±cult
to design satisfactory security protocols for such networks. Resource constraints make
wireless networks more vulnerable to denial of service attacks than wired networks. Mo-
bility in wireless networks also introduces new requirements in security protocol design.
As mobile users are roaming within wireless networks, users' private information like
location, movement pattern should be protected from potential adversaries.
While group key management in wireless ad hoc networks is further complicated
by complexity of multi-party protocols and absence of infrastructure in such networks.
Multi-party security protocols is much more complex than two-party ones as more weak
links exist in group key protocols and more attacks are possible to compromise the
system. What makes things worse is lack of infrastructure in ad hoc networks. Since
there is no authority or trusted server existing in ad hoc networks, mobile users are
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required to authenticate each other and agree on a group key on their own. Moreover,
group key management schemes need to consider not only group key establishment but
also membership dynamics.
In this thesis, we investigated authentication and key establishment in wireless net-
works. We ¯rst studied two-party authentication and key exchange problems in wire-
less networks, and analyzed previous solutions for wireless LAN. We identi¯ed security
weaknesses in previous security schemes for wireless networks, and proposed two new
protocols to replace them. Our ¯rst authentication and key exchange protocol is based
on public key cryptosystem. While the other protocol employs a weak password shared
between a client and a server to achieve authentication and key exchange. The PKC-
based protocol requires both the client and the server have a certi¯cate. While our
password-based protocol does not require a certi¯cate on the client side but a shared
password between the client and the server. Both our protocols achieve mutual au-
thentication and secure key exchange for access control in wireless networks, and they
also o®er client identity anonymity and resistance to DoS attacks. Since the password-
based protocol removes the need for client certi¯cates, it gets rid of burden in certi¯cate
management and hence provides great convenience for clients.
We then studied group key agreement for ad hoc networks. Most of previous pro-
posals on group key agreement employ a binary key tree to improve computation and
communication e±ciency. But these schemes did not take network topology into account
in protocol design. Therefore, we presented a group key agreement scheme constructing
key tree from the underlying network topology. Our scheme constructs the key tree
piggybacking on the multicast tree from the multicast scheme. With this specially con-
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structed key tree, the group key agreement can be accomplished with great e±ciency.
This property reduces computation and communication e®orts dramatically for our key
tree in join, leave, partition and merge operations. We implemented our protocol on
ns-2 and analyzed the performance of our protocol. The result shows that our protocol
has a much less delay compared to TGDH, and as the network size and the group size
increase, the delay of our protocol increases slowly while the delay of the TGDH protocol
increases dramatically.
We also presented another group key agreement based on shared passwords : server-
assisted group password-authenticated key exchange protocol. This protocol is e±cient
in both computation and communication, and it can be used in variants of ad hoc
networks where trusted servers are available. In this protocol, each client shares an
independent password with a trusted server, which is referred to as the independent-
password setting. Under this independent-password setting, our protocol provides better
°exibility than those protocols under the single-password setting. Moreover, the pro-
tocol employs a Di±e-Hellman key tree for group key agreement, and hence achieves
great e±ciency in both computation and communications. We also provided a detailed
security and performance analysis for the proposed protocol.
Future Research Directions
Though security issues in wireless networks have attracted considerable attention and
research e®orts, there are still many challenging security problems in wireless networks
needing to be solved. First of all, it is crucial to provide privacy protection in wireless
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networks to thwart tra±c analysis, movement tracing etc. Privacy issues for wireless
networks comprise of identity anonymity, location privacy, routing privacy, network
topology privacy, motion pattern privacy, to name but a few. However, relatively little
work on anonymity [124] has been carried out in this direction for wireless networks,
while other areas such as like unlinkability and unobservability [125] remain relatively
untouched. On top of this we need to consider the possibility of providing DoS resistance
at the same time.
² Identity Anonymity. Identity anonymity is a basic requirement in the prevention
of privacy information such as location and motion pattern from being disclosed
to adversaries. Anonymity can also ensure that the behavior of a mobile node is
completely hidden from attackers. In a wireless environment, anonymity compro-
mise also means compromise of location privacy and disclosure of motion patterns.
How to design a strong and e±cient anonymous scheme for ad hoc networks and
sensor networks still remains a challenge.
² Network Topology Privacy. The mobility of wireless networks results in a dynamic
network topology, and the network topology itself becomes a part of the privacy
information that potentially needs protection from adversaries.
² Location and Motion Pattern Privacy. Advances in positioning technologies en-
able location-based services like GPS, and such location-based services provide
convenience, safety and other bene¯ts. While location information is used in de-
signing secure schemes for routing or key agreement in a wireless environment.
Consequently, protection of location privacy and motion pattern from being re-
vealed has become a serious problem that needs solving.
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² Unlinkability and Unobservability. Unlinkability and unobservability are two strong
requirements for privacy protection. Though similar schemes have been proposed
for wired networks, it cannot be employed for wireless networks directly due to
the unique characteristics of wireless networks. We plan to achieve unlinkability
and unobservability for ad hoc and sensor networks by adapting mechanisms used
for wired networks.
Regarding group key management schemes, the concept of privacy protection is
complicated and enriched by complexity of multi-party settings. It is a challenging task
to design a sound group key management scheme to satisfy the privacy requirement for
wireless networks. In group key management schemes, attacks against group members
take much more complex forms than two-party protocols. A valid group member may
want to probe information of another group member, while several group members
could collude to compromise another member or the whole system. Moreover, privacy
protection under multi-party settings means no one know who is in the group and who
is not in the group. Also the factor of mobility should be considered when designing
group key management schemes.
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